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An Abstract
This assessment of the Minimalist sculpture of artists Robert Morris 
and Richard Serra endeavours not only to describe the ways in which 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy has been utilised 
to analyse the formal character of their work, but also to question the 
extent to which critical interpretations of such artworks may lay claim to 
their intended meaning. Firstly, Merleau-Ponty's significant text, the 
Phenomenology o f Perception, will be introduced by exploring a number 
of its themes relating to perception and to how the body acts as a locus for 
hum an experience within the phenomenal world. Secondly, it will be 
shown how notable comments taken from the Phenomenology  have been 
discussed in relation to several of Robert Morris's Minimalist artworks 
made between 1962 and 1969. Next, additional ideas taken from the 
Phenomenology  will be brought to bear on the Minimalist sculpture of 
Richard Serra whose artworks and writings from between 1966 and 1980 
have also been interpreted, like those of Morris, to be products of a general 
phenomenological 'sensibility'.
Yet as part of the conclusion to this thesis, the contemporary, critical 
reception of Morris's and Serra's works will be discussed and particularly, 
the problematic ways in which Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory 
has been used by commentators to 'explain' several of the non-traditional 
aspects of their practice. This ultimately serves to bring into question the 
applicability of such theory to these artists' production. Firstly, we will 
inspect what evidence is provided by Morris's and Serra's artworks and 
writings which would support their connection with Pontean theory. 
Secondly, we will look at just how critics cite Merleau-Ponty's text as a 
source for Minimalist practice. At the end of such analyses, we may be 
better able to assess whether the rigourous interpretation of many of these 
artists' works by way of the Phenomenology  is justified, or whether this 
critical trend is a misapplication of a complex philosophical theory to an 
equally complex and multivalent form of art practice.
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction
How may one attempt, in the space of a single discussion, to present two very 
distinct and seemingly unrelated histories of human activity, one stemming 
from the traditions of Continental philosophy and the other emerging from 
the contemporary, American art 'scene' of the 1960s? Perhaps more 
importantly within the context of this discussion, one should ask not just how 
these issues will be introduced here, b u t also, to w hat extent is 
phenomenological theory actually relevant to the Minimalist artworks of 
sculptors Robert Morris and Richard Serra?
The unique phenomenological position developed by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in France between the 1940s and 1960s - an attitude given full 
exploration in his major work Phénoménologie de la perception, or the 
Phenomenology of Perception  ^ - is one related specifically to the revision of 
attitudes toward the nature of human perception and its inherence in a world 
of objects, or what are termed 'phenomena'. This text along with Merleau- 
Ponty's other theoretical works, such as his La Structure du Comportment,'^ 
constitute a concerted move away from a Cartesian sensibility which 
privileges the intellect and a move toward a philosophy intent on a 'return to 
phenomena', or to the objects of consciousness. His revision of this traditionH 
approach to understanding the world-as-lived stems from Edmund Husserl’s 
early phenomenological project but also ultimately differs from it. Husserl’s 
original search for the 'essences’ or meanings of perceived phenomena 
contrasts significantly with Merieau-Ponty's motivations: to revise the study 
of perception so that it isolates the importance of 'existence' rather than
^Maurice M erleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) and 
Phenomenology o f Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
Hereafter referred to as the Phénoménologie and the Phenomenology, respectively.
^Idem. La Structure du Comporhnent (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942).
'essence'.3 The semantic differences between these two possible goals or 'ends' 
of the phenomenological reduction are not minor; whereas the search for the 
essences of 'tilings' or phenomena requires some form of conscious inquiry 
beyond the perception of the things themselves, the acknowledgement of 
their existence is immediate and pre-intellectual. Likewise, Merieau-Ponty's 
project can be seen revising phenom enologist M artin Heidegger's 
: concentration on the importance of time or temporality to lived experience - 
an attitude forcefully declared in Heidegger's seminal text Sein und ZeitA Yet 
at every point in his philosophical proposals, and especially in tliose offered 
in the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty tethers his inspection of human 
perception to a world composed of objects, people and various other 
phenomena. 5 Because of his discussion of the objective world and our
3Xhe twentieth-century phenom enological project to w hich M erleau-Ponty is linked was 
arguably in itiated  by H usserl's essay "Ideas", from his General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology (Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie iind phanomenologischen Philosophie). 
Originally published in the faltrbuch fiir Philosophie nnd phdnoinenologische Porschnng, Freiburg 
‘(Halle: Niemeyer, 1913), 1-323. For a lucid and engaging assessment of Husserl's contribution 
to contemporary phenomenological philosophies, see Joseph J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's 
Phenomenology (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1994). For yet a larger description of 
the tw en tieth -cen tu ry  p h en om en olog ica l project, see  C hristopher M acann, Four 
Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heideggei\ Sartre, Merlenu-Ponty (London: Routledge, 
1993).
'^Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, originally published in Husserl's Jahrbucli fiir Philosophie and 
phiinomenologische Forschung (Halle: Niem eyer, 1927). Published again in 1949 (Tübingen: 
Niem eyer) and as Being and Time, trans. Jolin Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: 
SCM Press, 1962). For a provocative study on the breadth of H eidegger's influence on  
philosophies this century, see Tom Rockmore, Heidegger nnd French Philosophy: Humanism, 
Antihiimanism, and Being (London: Routledge, 1995).
^Such could sim ilarly be said of the ideas contributed by Merieau-Ponty's close friend and 
colleague Jean-Paul Sartre. Both he and Sartre developed their individual approaches to the 
phenomenological project in the context of the French existentialist m ovem ent of which they 
formed integral parts. H owever, it is important to note that as much as the two shared a 
commitment to the phenom enological pursuit of 'being', the publication of Merieau-Ponty's 
decidedly anti-Communist text Adventures of the Dialectic in 1955 spawned a rift between he 
and Sartre, and calls attention to the divergent 'practical' sensibilities of each. Sartre's theories, 
m ost cogently represented in liis text L'être et le néant: Essay d'ontologie phenomenologicfue 
(Paris: Gallim ard, 1943) or Being and Nothingness, trans. H azel Barnes (N ew  York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956), dem and activist-minded participation for viability, and are in 
contrast to M erieau-Ponty’s less agitational attitude toward social action. For expanded  
discussions of Sartre and Merieau-Ponty's philosopliical partnership as well as the origins of 
French existentialism , see these varied yet w orthw hile sources: Max Charlesworth, The 
Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre (London: George Prior Publishers, 1976); F. H. Heineman, 
Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958); Eugene F. 
Kaelin, An Existentialist Aesthetic: The Theories of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Madison: University 
of W isconsin Press, 1966); Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early
participation in it, one may begin to understand the links made by many art 
historians and critics between Merieau-Ponty's Phenomenology and the 
Nlinimalist works highlighted in this appraisal.
Although the characteristics of their individual projects have varied 
considerably since the late 1950s, when both Morris and Serra became 
involved in the study and practice of art, these artists' works are also similar 
in significant ways. Notably, their production has maintained a repeated 
interest in reformulating the unique perceptual properties inherent in 
sculpture, or more appropriately termed for this dicussion, three-dimensional 
compositions. 6 Much of their interest in large-scale, multi-media works acts as 
a direct response to the dominant position of Abstract Expressionist painting 
in many museum and gallery spaces in America and abroad. ^  Critical of the 
detached role of the spectator in relation to these paintings and of the way in 
which their 'meaning' lie hidden or imbedded in them, several Minimalist 
artists including Morris, Serra, Sol Le Witt and Donald Judd began making 
essentially prim ary - or so-called 'minimal' - forms which emphasise
Sarti‘ean Themes (London; Routledge, 1994); Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt: The 
Main Themes and Phases of Existentialism (N ew  York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1960); Jean- 
Paul Sarti'c: Contemporanj Approaches to His Philosophy, Hugh J. Silverman and Frederick A. 
Elliston, eds. (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980). Finally, for tw o texts which look  
exhaustively  at the issues m entioned, see  Robert C. Solom on, From Rationalism To 
Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgivunds (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1985) and Stephen Priest's recent contribution, Merleau-Ponty (London: 
Routledge, 1998).
^Notable influences on Morris's and Serra's earliest work include Dada, Arte Povera, modern 
dance and others. For discussions of these artists' work wliich cover their earliest or most 
recent methods of production and also give extensive biographical details about Morris and 
Serra, see these d istinguished assessm ents: M aurice Berger, Labyrinths: Robert Morris, 
Minimalism, and the 1960s (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1989); Richard Serra, Ernst-Gerhard 
G use, ed. (N ew  York: Rizzoli, 1987); Serpentine Gallery, London, Richard Sena: Draunngs,Qx. 
cat. (London and Düsseldorf: Serpentine Gallery together with Richter Verlag, 1992); Tate 
Gallery, London, Richard Serra: Weight and Measure 1992, ex. cat. (London and Düsseldorf: 
Tate Gallery together with Richter Verlag, 1992).
^The pre and post-war sensation of Abstract Expressionism and related styles of production 
have been critically surveyed in a num ber of worthwhile texts. See Michael Auping, AbsttucL 
Expressionism: The Critical Deoelopmeftts (N ew  York: Harry N. Abrams, 1987), Pollock and After: 
The Critical Debate, Francis Frascina, ed, (London: Harper and Row, 1985), Frances Morris, 
Paris Post War: A rt and Existentialism 1945-1955, ex. cat. (London: Tate Gallery, 1993) and 
Stephen Polcari, Abstract Expressionisrrc ami the Modern Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991).
interaction with the works themselves and the creation of meaning which 
results from such an engagement - an engagement taking place in the ’present 
tense' of real, objective space and time. Not surprisingly, such body-centred 
works tempted many art critics and historians to quickly read into them a 
general phenomenological sensibility, and in some cases a distinctively 
Pontean handling of issues related to hum an perception.^ Perhaps most 
distinguished and influential among them is the critic Rosalind Krauss, whose 
writings on what was then called the 'New Sculpture' can be seen to have 
effectively estabhshed the now accepted, phenomenology-centred discourse 
which surrounds it.
Yet, to reiterate a question posed earlier, to what extent Is Merieau- 
Ponty's philosophy directly - or perhaps even indirectly - relevant to the work 
of Morris and Serra? It may appear as if, in light of the research and analyses 
of Rosalind Krauss and others, the connection between this theory and 
Minimalist art practice is a foregone conclusion. However, we may like to 
question such a state of affairs and offer an alternative account of how and 
why phenomenology was brought to bear on the American art scene of the 
1960s and 1970s. Throughout the course of this critical appraisal of specific 
phenomenological 'readings' of Morris's and Serra's IVlinimalist works, a move 
will be made toward greater clarity in understanding whether or not using 
Merieau-Ponty's Phenomenology to interpret and explain several of these 
works is at all constructive, and whether it enables us to reach an improved 
understanding of their creation and their meaning. To do this, this discussion
^Many of the m ost recognisable nam es in contem porary criticism  apply a general 
phenomenological interpretation to these artists' works. Particularly, see the comments made 
by Kenneth Baker in Minimalism: Art o f Circumstance (N ew  York: Abbeville Press, 1988), 
Briony Per in On Abstract Art (N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Hal Foster in The 
Return of the Real (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), Rosalind Krauss in Passages in Modern 
Sculpture, 10th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994) and Gilles A. Tiberghien in Land Art, 
trans. Caroline Green (London; Art Data, 1995). Specific issues regarding this trend in 
interpretation w ill be discussed as part of this thesis's conclusion, where a number of these 
texts w in be looked.
will attempt to locate alleged references to Merieau-Ponty's theory both 
within Morris's and Serra's works as well as in a number of their writings.
Perhaps most importantly, the concluding discussion of these artists' 
works seeks to question accepted critical approaches to their interpretation. 
Most often, as will be pointed out in relation to particular commentators, 
historians tend to cite Merieau-Ponty's text as an 'inspirational' document for 
the Minimalists. More specifically, although these artists' works at times deal 
only implicitly with issues relating to phenomenological philosophy, their 
products are predominantly discussed by critics in specific terms drawn from 
the Phenomenology. With the assistance of numerous comments made by the 
critic Susan Sontag, we will be able to question such criticism, criticism which 
appears to privilege theoretical interpretation over that which is involved in 
the direct experience of such works. Tlius, the task of this thesis will be not 
only to trace the critically acknowledged, phenomenological influences upon 
the work of Robert Morris and Richard Serra, but also to analyse and question 
the appropriateness of such critical approaches to their production, 
approaches which often seem to suggest that the intended meaning of these 
ÎVlinimalist artworks is uncovered through intellection, rather than by way of 
first-hand experience.
Chapter 2
Merieau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception and Its 
Conception of Human Experience
What is tliis being, then, that shimmers and, as it were, 
glitters in the opening of the Cogito, yet is not sovereignly 
given in it or by it?^
- Michel Foucault
Since its earliest discussion this century in the works of Edmund Husserl, 
the phenomenological concept of being' and its relation to the world - to 
hum an, experience and phenom ena, or all things perceived - has 
undergone both radical and limited change. Cuhninating in both the pre- 
War and post-War texts of the French existential theorists, this fluctuating 
attitude toward the nature of human perception has drastically redefined 
Husserl's original search for the 'essence' or meaning of the phenomenal 
world; yet its writers have also maintained allegiance to this 'world-as- 
Hved' as the context for their departure from the Cartesian concept Cogito 
ergo sum: "I think, therefore I am"A Despite those currents within 
philosophy itself which appear to perpetually decide which established 
theories (as well as theorists) are and are not critically fashionable, the 
m odern  phenom enological project m ost associated w ith M aurice 
Merieau-Ponty's work from the 1940s to the 1960s - and particularly with 
his major text, the Phenomenology of Perception - consistently "tries to
^Foucault, The Order of Things. (London; Tavistock Publications, 1970), 325. Originally  
published as Les M ots et les choses. (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). Foucault's relation to the 
phenomenological tradition is discussed in Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, French P h ilosoph y  
of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism, trans. Mary H. S. Cattani (Amherst; University  
of Massachusetts Press, 1990) and in Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision 
in Twentieth-Centwy French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
^René Descartes clearly proposes this in his Discourse on the Method, first published in 
1637 as Discours de la Méthode: "observing that this proposition, I am thinking, therefore I 
exist, was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were 
incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it w ithout scruple as the first 
principle of the philosophy I was seeking," (Part IV, AT VI 32: GSM I 127). Reprinted in 
The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, John Cottingham , ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 7.
7give a direct description of our experience as it is" and "offers an account 
of space, time and the w orld as we l iv e ' them " or "du  m onde 
« v é c u s »  ".3
This characteristic of his theory and its steady refinem ent 
th roughou t the Phenom enology  are the areas of the m odern  
phenomenological project which will be brought to bear most on those 
aspects of the Minimalist practices of Robert Morris and Richard Serra 
described in the 'Introduction'. In later, individual assessments of these 
artists' productions, notable examples of Merieau-Ponty's attitude toward 
the revision of bodily experience will stand vis à vis works by these artists 
which, it has been argued, expand on his phenomenological ideas, yet 
which are now influenced by a range of artistic considerations. However, 
before an in-depth discussion is undertaken, a summarised account of 
Merieau-Ponty's project as interpreted through selected portions of the 
Phenomenology o f Perception will provide the background for future 
analyses. It wiU also allow for a later assessment of the way in which this 
philosophy has been applied by a number of critics to Morris's and Serra's 
artistic enterprises.
I. Grounding Perception in the World
From the outset, the Phenom enology  directly expresses the context 
for its revision of perception; as seems obvious for a study of human 
activity, Merieau-Ponty's analyses are tethered to the world 'as it is', or the 
world as is appears and feels to us in our everyday experiences. He does, 
however, make clear that the 'obviousness' of this context and its 
"inalienable presence"^ have at times been obscured from our awareness
3jVIerleau-Poaty, Phenomenology of Perception; vii, and Phénoménologie de la perception;
1 1 .
^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, vii.
and for several reasons. Particularly, the effects of Science - according to 
Merleau-Ponty, a rationalising entity rem oved from first-hand experience 
of the world - have distracted 'us' (meaning humanity, both collectively 
and individually) from the "direct and  prim itive contact"^ which is 
necessary for a pre-reflective understanding of our situation in the world. 
After all, he suggests:
All of my knowledge of the world, even my scientific 
knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, 
or from  some experience of the w orld w ith which the 
symbols of science w ould be m eaningless. The whole 
universe of science is built upon the world as directly 
experienced [...].^
This 'particular point of view’ of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is, as we 
shah discover, the key to understanding the Phenomenology's  return not 
only to the tangible world of phenomena, but also to a world inhabited by 
an "incarnate subjectivity"^ or the individual. This is, as Merleau-Ponty 
states, because "[we] shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity 
and true meaning of phenomenology"; for the philosopher as well as the 
'lay-person' or non-specialist, "[it] is less a question of counting up 
quotations than of determ ining and expressing in concrete form this 
phenomenology for  ourselves" A H um an perception is not understood 
solely after the dissection of our anatomy or the description of our
5lbid .
^Ibid., viii.
^Monika M. Langer, M erieau-Ponty's "Phenomenology o f Perception": A Guide and 
Com m entary  (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), xv. Langer’s commentary offers a clear and 
concise sum m ary of the major points offered in  the Phenomenology. T h is task has 
traditionally frustrated scholars due to the text's at tim es com plex language, w hich can 
give a false im pression of the author's essentially clear objectives.
°M erleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, viii. ft is im portant to extend this phenom enological 
opportunity to the 'common' person. A lthough M erieau-Ponty's text w as intended for a 
specialist audience, its scope encompasses the w orld not just of the philosopher (which, 
according to the theorist’s ow n  definition, w ould  be one artificially isolated from the 
stream of the everyday) but also of anyone and everyone, since it is ultimately a world 
which can be shared on the most basic level.
psychological processes but is seen as the product, again, of this 'particular 
point of view':
I am the absolute source [of my perception], my existence does 
not stem from my antecedents, from my physical and social 
environm ent; instead it moves ou t tow ards them and 
sustains them, for I alone bring into being for myself (and 
therefore into being in the only sense that the word can have 
for me) the tradition which I elect to carry on, or the horizon 
whose distance from me would be abolished. . . if I were not 
there to scan it with my gaze.^
In this statement we witness Merieau-Ponty's departure from the 
idea that the facticity of the w orld follows only after the subject 
apprehends him or herself in the process of existing - the essence of 
Descartes' Cogito ergo sumA^ "This move", he says, "is absolutely distinct 
from the idealist return  to consciousness [...]. Analytical reflection", or 
w hat one could call Cartesian 'hyper-reflection', "starts from our 
experience gf the world and goes back to the subject as to a condition of 
possibility distinct from that of experience [...].. To this extent it ceases to 
rem ain part of our experience and offers, in place of an account, a 
reconstruction."^^ On the contrary, he contends:
The world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it 
would be artificial to make it the outcome of a series of 
syntheses which link, in the first place sensations, then 
aspects of the object corresponding to difference perspectives, 
when both are nothing but products of analysis, with no sort 
of prior reality .12
Yet despite Merieau-Ponty's continuous hints at the revisionist nature of 
his project in the Phenomenology, his dedication to creating a unique way
^ibid.
^^"Descartes and particularly Kant d e ta ch ed  the subject, or consciousness, by show ing that 
I could not possibly apprehend anything unless I first of all experienced m yself as existing  
in the act of apprehending it. They presented consciousness, the absolute certainty of m y  
existence for myself, as the condition of there being anything at all". Ibid., ix. 
l^Ibid., ix-x.
^ 2 l b i d . ,  X.
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by which the living, breathing, experiencing subject may achieve closest 
contact with his or her environment rem ains param ount. This aspect of 
his text, and its deliberate link to the world-as-given or as we live it, is one 
which can now be highlighted in its ow n right. This will be the main 
avenue of engagement between Merieau-Ponty's text and the works of 
Morris and Serra to be discussed shortly, during which certain questions 
will be put to their production. Namely, what are the characteristics of this 
revised w orld  which have been allegedly in te rp re ted  by specific 
Minimalist propositions? How is this world supposedly made accessible 
to the spectator-participant through their works? How is the body's 
experience of such hindered or enhanced? Having posed such questions, 
we may now begin to give form to Merieau-Ponty's definition of this 
world and likewise, to describe the im peratives for this context from 
which his revision stems.
Continuing further into the 'Preface', M erleau-Ponty begins to 
expand specifically on the nature of w hat he term s the "field of 
perception" or as we have been calling it, the world in general; here he 
claims that this field of phenom ena, or things perceived, is one 
"constantly filled w ith a play of colours, noises and fleeting tactile 
sensations [...], which [we]... immediately 'place' in the world, w ithout 
ever confusing them  w ith  [our] d a y  d r e a m s . 3  According to this 
definition, the 'real' is therefore not a stale, bland or colourless interiority, 
but an interplay or "closely woven fabric"^ ^  of experience. As mentioned, 
lliis field is also one wliich exists a priori any analyses we may construct in 
response to the given w orld; for, this phenom enal w orld "is the 
background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them. 
The world is not an object such that [we] have in [our] possession the law
^3lbid.
■l^Ibid.
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of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all [our] thoughts 
and explicit p e r c e p t i o n s . Perhaps more clearly, Merleau-Ponty asserts 
that this world is "the perm anent horizon of all [our] cogitationes" and is 
"a d im ension  in re la tion  to which [we are] constantly situating 
[ o u r s e lv e s ] . I t  can be understood then that the fluctuating nature of 
hum an perception, as described by the author, is based almost solely on a 
world of varied experience which is also in flux. Linked arguably to 
Heraclitus’ earliest thoughts on flux or perpetual c h a n g e , ^   ^ Merieau- 
Ponty 's thoughts do not spring from  a w orld occupied only by 
philosophers bu t from a context constructed from the m ost basic of 
situations. He says;
Reflection does not w ithdraw  from the world towards the 
unity of consciousness as the w orld’s basis; it steps back to 
watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a 
fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the 
w orld and thus brings them  to our notice; it  alone is 
consciousness of the world because it reveals that world asstrange and paradoxical.^ ^
This excerpt from the P henom enology  emphasises those characteristics 
which will be brought forward into the discussion of Robert Morris and 
Richard Serra, and specifically the ways in which their work draws from 
this text. Most notably here, Merleau-Ponty calls attention to where such 
m oments of perceptual excitement or interest may be found: in the 
'everyday' or commonplace situation. More than as a simple simile to
t^ibid., xi.
^^Ibid., xiii.
t^Severai points made by the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 521-c. 487 
B.C.) characterise the w orld in much the sam e w ay as does M erleau-Ponty in  his 
Phenomenology. Perhaps the philosopher’s m ost fam ous statement, "panta rhei" or "all 
things flow", can be found in his Fragments, a text written betw een c. 510-c. 480 B.C. The 
phenom enologist Martin H eidegger him self uses Heraclitus as a source for his 1947 essay, 
"Letter on Humanism", reprinted in The E ssentialist Tradition: Selected W ritings, N ino  
Langiulli, ed. (N ew  York: Doubleday, 1974). For an extensive discussion of the context and 
work of Heraclitus, see Charles H. Kahn, The art and thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xiii.
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highlight the 'w ondrous' quality of experiencing the w o r l d , this 
description of a crackling fire can be read as indicative of the very com m on 
or basic nature of Merieau-Ponty's world concept. This is certainly not 
intended to indict his work for being philosophically crude or un-rigorous, 
b u t rather merely serves to emphasise the open attitude toward the 
significance of hum an experience which he m aintains throughout the 
Phenom enology. By speaking about such situations, he extends 
philosophical importance to the everyday events of life, rather than 
confining the awareness of such values to trained, philosophical circles. 
As he first argues in the Preface, one of the prim ary objectives of 
phenom enology is to "[endow contact w ith  the w orld] w ith  a 
philosophical s t a t u s . Y e t ,  as mentioned, this world is not in any way 
exclusive but rather 'strictly' inclusive and embraces all forms of hum an 
experience. The phenomenological enterprise must, to be faithful to the 
nature of the world as Merleau-Ponty understands it, strive to incorporate 
disparate, 'paradoxical' and heterogeneous encounters into its definition 
of hum an perception.
The whole of the Phenomenology's  preface provides a clear 
description of the world which is to be investigated and revised by 
M erleau-Ponty throughout the text. I t is one whose philosophical 
approach "is as painstaking as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valéry or 
Cézanne - by reason of the same kind of attentiveness and wonder, tire 
same dem and for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the 
world or of history as that meaning comes into being."2' This nascent 
meaning, he contends, "is revealed where the paths of [our] various 
experiences intersect, and also where [our] own and other people's
1 ^ Merleau-Ponty openly borrows this notion from the work of Edmund Husserl’s assistant, 
Eugen Fink. Specifically, see Fink's essay "Die phanom enologische Philosophie Edmund 
Husserls in der gegenwartigen Kritik", Kantstiidien  38 (1933).
2^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, vii.
2 h b id ,, xxi.
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intersect and engage each other like gears,"22 Alternatively said, Merleau- 
Ponty emphasises here that the perception of the world is not isolated 
from the flow of life but is rather dependent upon its diversity.
The m ost com m on hallm arks of hum an experience w hich 
Merleau-Ponty focuses on throughout the Phenom enology - namely, their 
boundlessness and fluctuation in accord with the world-as-lived - may at 
times appear to be redundant or over-stated subjects of discussion. Yet 
bearing in m ind the centrality of these prem ises to the whole of 
phenomenological philosophy itself, we will witness throughout the 
rem ainder of the text the same, repeated dedication to the 'everyday' 
world. In light of these points, we may likewise lay the ground for an 
exploration of the ways in which the Phenomenology has been used to 
describe Morris's and Serra's artworks and these pieces radical formal 
character.
II. Returning to Phenomena
M uch as the Phenom enology's  Preface, M erieau-Ponty's 
'Introduction' continues the refinement of his notion of the perceivable 
world, yet now in response to what he calls the 'traditional p r e j u d i c e s '23 of 
such empirical disciplines as science and psychology. However, unlike the 
Preface and the remaining bulk of the text (nearly thirteen out of its total 
seventeen chapters), the In troduction  constitutes not so m uch an 
exposition of Merieau-Ponty's new philosophical points as it does a 
refutation of traditional ways of thinking about hum an perception - 
perception still being based in a world of diverse and complex experience. 
This section's challenges to the deeply fixed inaccuracies of empirical 
analysis can then be placed within the overall, revisionist project of the
22lbid., X X . I
23xhis section itself entitled Traditional Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena'. I
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Phenomenology o f Perception and perhaps be linked to the challenges of 
the 'N ew ' art produced by Morris and Serra which, later in this appraisal, 
can be seen to reinterpret the function and interactive potential of various 
exhibition contexts.
Beginning with the notion of sensation, which he terms a unit of 
experience’, Merleau-Ponty gradually constructs a difficult test both of 
traditional thoughts on perception and of his reader's own knowledge of 
works by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. Yet, the steady 
presence in his discussion of the theme of the world-as-lived obviates 
many of the problems encountered by the 'lay' reader; it is by way of this 
common base for his analyses that Merleau-Ponty succeeds at offering an 
accessible and, at the same time, rich phenomenological m ethod in his 
text. His comments regarding sensation are little different. Despite the 
explicit references to various scientific and psychological theories 
throughout this section, Merleau-Ponty returns to, as the ground for his 
theory, the world as it is both for the philosophically sophisticated as well 
as for the civilian. In fact, it is these very empirical theories which, he 
claims, have obscured what is by its nature a clear and straightforward way 
of contacting the phenomenal world:
At the outset of the study of perception, we find in language 
the notion  of sensation, which seems im m ediate and 
obvious: I have a sensation of redness, of blueness, of hot or 
cold. It will, however, be seen that nothing could in fact be 
more confused, and that because they accepted it readily, 
traditional analyses missed the phenomenon of perception.24
So how, then, is sensation defined and how is it misleading for us if we 
are to consider ourselves phenomenologists? Sensation, as conceived by 
Merleau-Ponty, may be understood as "the way in which [we are] affected 
and the experiencing of a state of [ourselves]"; it is "the greyness which,
24ibid., 3.
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when [we] close [our] eyes, surrounds [us], leaving no distance between [us] 
and it" .25 Therefore sensation does not have a detectable beginning nor an 
end; it is '"undifferentiated, instantaneous" and "corresponds to nothing 
in our e x p e r i e n c e ".26 In one case, we can examine the way in which the 
experience of various colours is 'understood ' and M erieau-Ponty's 
scenario for this analysis is particularly insightful, yet at the same time 
straightforward and lucid:
This red patch which I see on the carpet is red only in virtue 
of a shadow which lies across it, its quality is apparent only in 
relation to the play of light upon it, and hence as an element 
in a spatial configuration. Moreover, the colour can be said to 
be there only if it occupies an area of a certain size, too small 
an area not being describable in these terms.27
In other words, colour is not a p roperty  of 'things' or phenom ena 
themselves, but rather the result of our interaction with the conditions in 
which such entities exist. To extend this concept to the discussion of 
sensation, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the notion of sensation be thrown 
out of phenomenological inquiry altogether, for it only serves to muddy 
the essential clarity of his project: "Once introduced, the notion of 
sensation distorts any analysis of perception".2® Pure sensations or 
impressions, as he has already mentioned, are unm editative 'states of 
oneself; reflecting upon such experiences "obscures what we thought was 
clear. We believed we knew what feeling, seeing and hearing were, and 
now  these w ords raise p r o b l e m s " , 2 9  because of the in tellectual 
explanations of science and psychology w hich seek to dissect the
25ibid.
26lbid. By this M erleau-Ponty suggests that sensation is not som ething ’understood’ from  
relationships w e form between ourselves and other people or things. It stems from  us and is 
not merely a product of the world which is then processed by our senses.
2 7 lb id ., 4 .
2 8 lb id ., 13.
29[bid., 10.
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im penetrable unity  of pure sensation. R eturning to "perceptual 
experience",
we notice that science succeeds in constructing only a 
semblance of subjectivity: it introduces sensations which are 
things, just where experience shows that they are meaningful 
patterns; it forces the phenomenal universe into categories 
which make sense only in the universe of science.30
The focus of Merieau-Ponty's criticism is explicit by this point in the text; it 
aims at those scientific, experientially-debased forms of registering the 
phenom enal w orld which take as granted that awareness of the lived 
'dimension' which is elucidated by phenomenology.
In his discussion of what he calls 'association' and 'the projection of 
m em ories’, Merleau-Ponty likewise scrutinises the effects of scientific 
analysis on the life-world and the resultant, debilitating fracture between 
what we 'understand' through experience and the phenom enal field in  
which this is discovered. To define what is meant by 'association' he offers 
very basic scenarios which again illustrate the straightforward nature of 
his project: "The 'association of ideas' which brings past experience into 
play can restore only extrinsic connections, and can be no more than one 
itself, because the original experience involved no others".31 In other 
words, here M erleau-Ponty moves against the assum ption that unique 
and separate experiences may be linked, by way of memory, to one another 
over a length of time, for "an impression can never by itself be associated 
with another impression". He goes on to dram atise this point at some 
length:
If I walk along a shore towards a ship which has run aground, 
and the funnel or masts merge into the forest bordering on 
the sand dune, there will be a m oment when these details 
suddenly become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused 
with it. As I approached, I did not perceive resemblances or
30lbid., 11.
3 iib id ., 14.
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proxim ities w hich finally came together to a form  a 
continuous picture of the upper part of the ship. [...] How 
could I have failed to see that these pieces of wood were an 
integral part of the ship?
It is only by 'placing' such stimuli or things "on the same footing, that of 
the unique object," that some coherence, "continuity and resemblance 
between them is possible".32 Therefore, experiences - in order that they be 
connected to one another - must be spread literally over some common 
physical and temporal terrain.
It is at this juncture that the reader now encounters Merieau- 
Ponty's views on the projection of memories, for this projection of past 
experience into the 'living' present is a related act of association which has 
traditionally been explained by way of physiognomy. What is m eant by 
this is described by our author: "It is shown that in the reading of a book 
the speed of the eye leaves gaps in the retinal impressions, therefore the 
sense-data must be filled out by a projection of memories"; yet according to 
this definition, "no sooner is the recollection of memories made possible 
than it becomes superfluous, since the work it is being asked to do is 
already d o n e . " 33  Thus the constantly  fluctuating  n a tu re  of the 
phenom enal w orld ultim ately makes the infringing of m em ory on 
perception obsolete, and because the emergence of recollections is best 
explained by way of our own biology, tliis concept ultimately detracts from 
the primacy of that first-hand experience which is unhindered by analysis 
and objectifying theory.
M erleau -P o n ty  concludes th is c ritic a l sec tio n  of the 
Phenom enology's  in troduction by extending his attack on empirical 
'm isunderstandings’ to intellecualist ones. Like the misguided concepts of 
sensation and association, he regards intellectualist explanations as
32ibid., 17.33[bid., 19 and 19n.
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repeatedly neglecting the world as it is directly experienced in favour of 
detached analysis. In his chapter on 'a tten tion  and  judgem ent' he 
specifically focuses on the concept of attention to highlight yet another 
dow nfall of over-intellectualisation: "A ttention is [...] a general and 
unconditioned power in the sense that at any moment it can be applied 
indifferently to any content of consciousness. Being everywhere barren, 
nowhere can it have its own purposes to fulfil. "34 In light of this, he 
continues, attention is unnecessary to an all-perceiving consciousness (i.e. 
a human being), for if nothing is hidden from perception at any time, the 
concept of attention as separate pow er is nonsensical. This notion can 
therefore be added to the list of so-called prejudices against which this 
section of the text makes a concerted, radical move.
Each of the traditional prejudices which Merleau-Ponty criticises - 
concepts generally accepted by scientific, physiognomic or intellectualist 
d iscip lines - m ay be seen no t only as concerns for m odern, 
phenom enological enquiries on the whole, bu t also as occupying an 
im portan t place specifically w ithin the revisionist structure of the 
Phenomenology of Perception, So integral are these issues to his own 
project that Merleau-Ponty commits his final introductory comments to 
reviewing his reasons for such. As he says of sensation and judgement: 
"we have observed that they were clear only as long as the prejudice in 
favour of the world was maintained";35 as soon as ones direct, physical 
connection with the phenomenal field is disrupted or even broken by any 
form of intellectualisation, concepts such as sensation then quickly 
become objects of analysis rather than bona fide states of experience. 
Merleau-Ponty can be seen to arguing strongly against this Cartesian view 
of perception which supports such analysis:
3 4 lb id ., 26.
35lbid., 53.
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As soon as one tried by means of them [i.e. sensation and 
association], to picture consciousness in the process of 
perceiving, to revive the forgotten perceptual experience, and 
to relate them to it, they were found to be inconceivable. By 
dint of m aking these difficulties m ore explicit, we were 
draw n implicitly into a new kind of analysis, into a new 
dimension in which they were destined to disappear.^^
It is this revisionist attitude which sum m arises the m ost transitional 
section of Merleau-Ponty's text. Before, as seen as early as its Preface, the 
P henom enology situELtes itself amongst the other phenomenological texts 
to which it is indebted and those alongside which it developed. Yet now  
by way of its Introduction, we may understand Merleau-Ponty's project as 
aspiring to m ore; not only does it form  part of the established 
phenomenological tradition but likewise charts a new, revised direction 
for ontological enquiry. As he remarks:
The first' philosophical act would appear to be to return  to the 
world of actual experience which is prior to the objective 
world, since it is in it that we shall be able to grasp the 
theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective 
world, restore to things their concrete physiognomy [...]. Our 
task W Ü1 be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of 
living experience through which other people and other 
things are first given to us [...]; to reawaken perception [...].^^
At the heart of this statement is a description of the specific locus for 
experience, one w hich have come to understand  th roughout the 
openning sections of the Phenom enology  as that of a hum an being or an 
Incarnate  subjectivity'. During the course of the text's introductory 
chapters, Merleau-Ponty thoroughly and lucidly describes the aims and 
aspirations of his project as they relate to such themes This is why the 
majority of the present discussion has focused almost exclusively on these
3^1bid., 53-54. Again, see p. ix of the Preface for M erleau-Ponty's comments on Descartes' 
position.
^7lbid., 57.
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portions of the Phenom enology. Whilst running the risk of ignoring the 
finer details of the later, more complex sections of the text, this 
concentrated analysis of the Phenom enology's  most general, introductory 
remarks on the nature of perception serves as a central focus for the up­
coming appraisals of Morris's and Serra's Minimalist artworks. However, 
it has been a well-considered ris; for whereas the Preface and Introduction 
of the P henom enology  speak of the broad phenomenological principles 
under M erleau-Ponty's scrutiny, the highly specialised chapters which 
follow them are perhaps addressed to an audience more familiar with 
specific arguments and aspects of the phenomenological tradition Thus, 
an analysis of these specific issues and the cases to which Merleau-Ponty 
often refers would require such rigourous philosophical consideration as 
to lay well-beyond the ambitions of this thesis.
Preparing for our pending discussions of Robert Morris and Richard 
Serra, we can now begin to assemble the m ost salient concepts of the 
Phenomenology o f Perception as presented thus far, concepts with which 
we can assess the possible associations betw een Merleau-Ponty's project 
and M inimalist practice Firstly, it may be crucial to rem ember that 
M erleau-Ponty conceives of the phenom enal world as "an open and 
indefinite multiplicity of relationships",^^ With this statement he asserts 
the possibly unequalled role of bodily experience in perception, as issue 
which is emphsised consistently throughout his text. At each of these 
points he hightlights his belief that the "body is the vehicle of being in the 
world" If we then combine these two elements of this philosphy, one 
may further suggest that, to be a 'body' in the world necessarily means to 
be exposed to that 'open and indefinite m ultiplicity' of experience which
38ibid., 71. 
39ibid., 82.
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characterises it. This point, described clearly in the earliest sections of the 
P henom enology, is arguably the concept which binds into a cohesive 
project the diverse issues Merleau-Ponty raises regarding the nature of 
hum an perception. It is this point, among others to be discussed in due 
course, which will now be brought forward to our appraisals of the works 
of Robert M orris and R ichard Serra in the hope tha t we may 
constructively assess the ways in which they have been connected to 
phenomenological philosophy and observe their artworks in terms of 
their particular relation to the expanded context for art practice of the 1960s 
and 1970s. At that close of these discussions, the very act of relating a 
theory as rigourous and specialised as that found in the P henom enology  
of Perception to forms of art-making as diverse and independent as those 
of the Minimalists, will be given considerable critical attention. Our 
primary objective will then be to anwer the question which was posed at 
the outset and which we should strive to bear in mind: namely, do 
Morris's and Serra's works provide sufficient justification for their critical 
association with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy?
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Cliaptsi 3 
Robert Morris: Revising Art Practice
Underlying the ^linimalist works of artist Robert Morris - those which 
dominated his production between 1962 and 1970 - one finds a commitment 
to revision similar to that found in the Phenomenology. Within the context of 
sixties art practice, one may assess Morris's propositions in terms of how they 
operate as formal reductions of art practice, as new orchestrations of the 
spaces they occupy, and as revisions of what Morris calls the traditional 
"structural fixes which have been imposed on art - stylistic, historical, social, 
economic, psychological."^ In the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty suggests that 
accepting such intellectual constructs as a priori frustrates a "return to things 
themselves" or to "that world which precedes knowledge" Throughout his 
essays published during the sixties, Morris criticises similar constraints. 
Specifically, Morris takes issue with a neglected fact of artistic production: 
"Whatever else art is, at a very simple level it is a way of making."^ In his 
essays on 'anti-form ' art and on his specific approach to its production, 
Morris develops this position in ways which have been linked to Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenological project - a project described comprehensively at 
the outset of the Phenomenology.
Whereas the artist's 'anti-form' felt pieces after 1967 emphasise the 
centrality of their own manufacture to their status as potentially finished 
products, Morris's artworks before this time evidence a shifted attention. His 
show at the Green Gallery (Fig. 1), which ran in New York from December 
1964 through January 1965, offers a collection of examples from this genre of
^Robert Morris, "Some N otes on the P henom enology of Making: The Search for the 
Motivated", Artforum, 8, no. 8 (April 1970). Reprinted in Morris, Continuous Project Altered 
Daily: The Writings of Robert Morris (Cambridge, Mass.: MÏT Press, 1995), 71.
^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: 1962), ix.
^Morris, "Some N otes on the Phenomenology of Making". Reprinted in Morris, 71,
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TiteraT or 'prim ary' structures. These works possibly highlight Morris's 
interest in pereption-centred art experience, and in doing so, initiate the 
artist's own revision of those conditions for 'art making' which were seen 
traditionally as a priori. Such early works differ substantially from his later 
'anti-form' pieces, both in their method of construction and in the perceptual 
conditions of which they form a part. Similarly, Morris's writings - published 
as a theoretical echo to his work - discuss these m arkedly different 
motivations. Attending to the artist's commentaries, his changing production, 
and their possible engagement with phenomenological motifs, Morris's 
Minimalist work can be seen to propose a new dialectic for the relationsliip 
between spectatorship and art practice to which we may like to compare 
Merleau-Ponty's attitude found in the Phenomenology of Perception.
I. The Spectator as a Perceiving Subject
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's text itself occupies a critical position in the 
context of post-war existential theory, a position of importance which, one 
may argue, is paralleled by Robert Morris's Minimalist work within the 
production of what was termed the 'New Art' during the 1960s. As Merleau- 
Ponty's Phenomenology offers a new version of the 'philosophy of being', it 
does so with an innovative clarity of purpose and a breadth of inquiry 
necessary for such a re-appraisal in an age marked by much social upheaval 
and reassessment. Morris's production is, too, characterised by such clarity: 
the artist's 'literal' and formally uncomplicated objects, such as those 
presented at the Green Gallery, emphasise lived, perceptual engagement and 
thereby challenge that m odernist art paradigm  which values additive, 
internal composition in painting and sculpture, as well as its purely optical
24
and cognitive effects A In constructing a dialogue between the artist's early 
Minimalist work and his writings of this period, we begin to relate several 
concepts from the Phenomenology to Morris's production and to observe the 
possible ways in which he may have been influenced by this rich philospliical 
theory.
When looking to Morris's essays published in Artfonun during 1966, 
the artist’s interest in the phenomenological notion of an irreducible, pre­
intellectual experience is arguably demonstrated in liis approach towards 
production. Similarly, interpretations of his early Minimalist sculptures 
support the view that Morris also utilised such ideas for these artworks. As 
has been highlighted, Merleau-Ponty discusses in his own text the necessity 
for perception "to return to things themselves...to return to that world which 
precedes knowledge". Bound to this revised approach to the world of objects 
is a "perceptual field...made up of 'things' and the 'spaces between things'."^ 
Returning to his original French text, we find a more expansive description of 
this newly appraised context: "Notre champs perceptif est fait de « c h o s e s »  
et de « v id e s  entre les choses»."^ Articulated in this way, the field of 
perception is characterised as an avenue of awareness punctuated by tangible 
forms and the 'voids' between them. In his essay "Notes on Sculpture, Part 1", 
Morris draws attention to the physical separation defining each phenomenon 
(or object) amongst other phenomena - a distinction germane to this concept 
of perception. Using a statement by Goethe which is kindred to this idea, 
Morris initiates a discussion which then extends throughout his essay and
'^ h e  critics Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried discuss the fundamental importance of 
such in ter-related constructions to m odem  production in their respective essays "Recentness 
of Sculpture", in American Sculpture of the Sixties, ex cat (Los Angeles; Los Angeles County 
M useum of Art, 1967), 24.-26, and "Art and Objecthood", Artforum , 5, no. 10 (June 1967), 12- 
23.
^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 15.
^Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 23.
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subsequent "Notes on Sculpture": "What comes into appearance must 
segregate in order to appear."^
This isolation of objects within a visually un-inflected environment 
translates into Morris's Untitled works as, what Clement Greenberg and 
Michael Fried would term, an effect of 'presence'.^ Negatively defined by 
these critics as the visual and perceptual inexhaustibility of Minimalist art, 
presence in these 'untitleds' draws a spectator's awareness towards the edges 
of Morris's objects. This conscious orchestration of products is a positive 
attempt by the artist to place lùs work within an exhibition context, mindful 
of the nexus of conditions affecting a viewer’s engagement - those lying 
out with or on the surface of these objects, such as gallery space and the 
proximity, scale and shape of the pieces. Returning to Morris's exhibition of 
early 'minimal' works at the Green Gallery, one observes how the artist 
further elaborates on these perception-based concepts. The exhibition 
featured pieces designed in 1964 expressly for the Green Gallery: Untitled 
(Cloud) - a modified form of his 1962 original-. Untitled (Comer Piece), Untitled 
(Wall/ Floor Slab), Untitled (Boiler), Untitled (Corner Beam), Untitled (Floor Beam) 
and Untitled (Table). This collection of works operates in tandem with the 
perceptual elements of its exhibition context. The viewer's participation in 
such works is not one privately confined to the mind by some mode of 
intellectualisation as it is in the necessary re-ordering of, or reflection upon, a 
modernist work's internal composition as suggested by Greenberg. Instead, 
M orris's propositions direct attention to their own physical limits in the 
gallery, and consequently to that liminal space which both defines their 
separation from one another as well as their organisation in a common site.
^Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part 1", Artforum, 4, no. 6 (February 1966), 42-44. Reprinted in 
Morris, 1,
^In their aforem entioned essays, both Greenberg and Fried characterise this notion of 
'presence' as a conscious (but negative) gesture against their definition of art as such. In 
contrast, one could argue that Morris uses a positive, phenom enological interpretation of this 
'presence' to revise the traditional, binary relationship betw een subject and object or 
spectator and artwork.
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Such a conscious orchestration may emphasise, as does Merleau-Ponty in the 
Phenomenology, that "the world is not what [we] think, but what [we] live 
through."^ Morris makes a similar point in his "Notes on Sculpture, Part 1", 
and further expands on this condition throughout his essays of the late sixties. 
In a comment regarding the general nature of 'new ' sculpture in the sixties, 
like that of emerging Minimalists Donald Judd and Carl Andre, Morris 
contends that the "experience of [tliese] solids establishes.. .facf'.^o
Morris's inclusion of a modified version of the 1962 Untitled (Cloud) at 
the Green Gallery show is, perhaps, an important decision to consider in its 
own right. The first English translation of Phénoménologie de la perception, 
published in the United States and Great Britain in 1962, was released near 
the time of Morris’s first so-called 'Minimalist' w o r k s .O f  course, this fact 
alone does not substantiate any conclusions made about the direct influence 
of the Phenomenology on his early Alinimalist work, but it helps to place this 
text within a collection of possible sources which may have influenced a 
generation of 'N ew ' artists. Yet this evidence, in  conjunction with a 
phenomenological interpretation of other works exhibited in the New York 
show and with the first publication of Morris's writings in 1966, suggests that 
the artisbs inclusion of this Untitled (Cloud) at the Green Gallery may offer an 
example of his earliest engagement with phenomenological concerns like 
those found in the Phenomenology. Among his revisions of perception, 
Merleau-Ponty's characterisation of the perceived world as a 'system' whose 
"experiences.. .  intersect and engage each other Hke g e a rs " m a y  be likened 
to Morris's systems of art objects. To illustrate this, several points made by the
^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xvi.
i^Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part 1". Reprinted in Morris, 7.
^^Similar p lyw ood works constructed by Morris in  1962, nam ely Untitled (Slab), Untitled 
(Frame) and Barrier, further support the claim that the publication of the Phenomenology in 
translation the same year proved a trem endous influence on the course of his sculptural 
project.
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xx.
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artist in his "Notes on Sculpture" essays bear repeating, for they construct a 
telling commentary on the complex motivations behind Morris's production.
In "Part 2" of his "Notes", Morris goes on to suggest that one such 'gear' 
at work in this perceptual machine of art objects is the viewer's awareness of 
scale - a concept he discusses using terms drawn from the Phenomenology . He 
proposes that "[in] the perception of relative size, the human body enters into 
the total continuum of sizes and establishes itself as a constant on that scale."; 
perhaps more importantly, "one knows immediately what is smaller and 
what is larger than himself." Morris's specific attention in this essay to ones 
instantaneous awareness of an object's scale translates itself into his work 
(such as that exhibited at the Green Gallery) by way of his deliberate 
organisation of the exhibition space.
Looking again at this collection of 'untitleds', one sees how Morris has 
spectators navigate through a gauntlet of his objects, and how they are 
literally forced to recognise the physical presence of such 'things! both in 
relation to each other and in relation to their own bodies. This literal invasion 
of 'one's own space' is also an element of Merleau-Ponty's call for the 
perceptual reduction  of lived experience. As he describes in the 
Phenojnenology: "Seeking the essence of consciousness will [...] not consist in 
developing the Wortbedeutiing of consciousness and escaping from existence 
[...] it will consist in rediscovering my actual presence to myself."!^By using 
the term  WortbedetiHmg as defined in  H usserl's discussion of the 
phenomenological 'essence' of lived experience, Merleau-Ponty suggests that 
the basic, pre-reflective operation of perception cannot be replaced by such 
intellectualised searches for its meaning. Rather, the experience of the 'self-in- 
the-world' m ust be reduced to ones bare perception of material phenomena 
through a physical relationship to it. Merleau-Ponty argues that the problem
^^Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part 2", Artforum, 5, no. 2 (October 1966), 20-23. Reprinted in 
Morris, 11.
^'^Merleau-Ponty, Phemmetwlogy, xv.
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with the traditional analyses of Descartes and Kant is that they were simply 
"idealist [returns] to consciousness" which "detached the subject", or locus of 
perception, from its physical situation within a field of objects.^^5 xhis retreat 
into the mind rather than into an inspection of the world frustrates him 
further: "Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of 
consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of 
transcendence fly up like the sparks of a fire".^^ Our ability to potentially 
relate Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'forms' as phenomena to Morris's production 
suggests that both of their projects are based similarly on ‘systems of objects'.
A provocative characteristic of Morris's early Minimalist works - one 
which will be used later in distinguishing its motivations from those of the 
artist's anti-form propositions - is their relation to the avenues for perceptual 
revision offered in the Phenomenology. Looking again at M orris's Green 
Gallery show, this element of his work can be explained in greater detail 
through a close inspection of how sucli propositions affect one another as 
well as the viewer. The large, 'public' nature of these Untitled works 
emphasises Morris's ambition to redress the traditionally private reception of 
art within a gallery. His 1966 essay "Notes on Sculpture, Part 2" echoes this 
motivation: "While specific size is a condition that structures one's response 
in terms of the more or less public or intimate, enormous objects in the class 
of monuments elicit a far more specific response to size qm  size [...]. The 
awareness of scale is a function of the comparison made between that 
constant, one's body size, and the o b j e c t . " jh is  drive to reposition the 
spectator's body within a complex system of perception may edio Merleau- 
Ponty's belief that "the relations between subject and [perceived] world are 
not strictly b i la t e r a l " W h e r e  Greenberg and Fried would see scale as
xiii.
^^Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part 2". Reprinted in Morris, 13. 
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phemmenologij, ix.
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m erely inducing a 'theatrical presence', Morris uses the towering or 
expansive proportions of each Untitled work to revise and highlight the 
effects of their mutual situation on the viewer's awareness of such. Whereas 
the explicitly 'visual' nature of previous art production , such as that of the 
Abstract Expressionists of the 1950s and 60s, can be to illicit a self-reflexive 
response from the spectator, each work presented at the Green Gallery 
frustrates any private reception which does not acknowledge these objects' 
function as part of a literal, physical condition. If one were to approach 
Morris's Untitled (Cloud) and Untitled (Corner Piece) (Fig. 2), their existence 
would seem inescapable. However, this is not the case if when a work is 
viewed from a remote standpoint. To avoid this 'literal' situation is to not 
enter the gallery space at all. As Merleau-Ponty might say, the viewer, or 
rather the participant, cannot w ithdraw from this art 'w orld ' w ithout 
overthrowing the perception of it altogether.
Extending the phenomenological notion that a viewer exists 'in-the- 
world', Morris's 'untitleds' allude to the spectator's body through the use of 
abstract hum an proportions and thereby strengthen the possibility of a 
personally engaging, perceptual experience of the work. In looking at these 
pieces, one could argue that they bear little resemblance to the human body 
with all of its characteristic, fleshy idiosyncrasies. However, the proportions 
of Morris's work at the Green Gallery are such that his Cloud appears to be 
one designed to intimately hover above only a single participant or a small 
number of people at one particular time. This cloud-like form also appears to 
have descended mid-way down the gallery solely to meet the spectator in a 
space shared by similar objects. Likewise, Morris's Untitled (Floor Beam) of 
1964 'connects' w ith the visitor near hip-level, catalysing an immediate, 
sensual dialogue between the object and the body's awareness of it.^^
As part of a similar appraisal, Kimberly Paice suggests that these works "allow a dialogue 
both with the architectural site and the viewer." This com m ent can also be placed in relation 
to M erleau-Ponty's desire for a 'return to objects' necessarily 'in-the-w orld', and not
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In addition to the works constructed for the Green Gallery, pieces 
made the following year also promote the issue of a spectator-partidpant's 
kinaesthetic interaction with objects which Morris focuses on throughout his 
earlier plywood works. The artist's Untitled (Mirrored Cubes) (Fig. 3), first 
fabricated in January 1965, constitutes a continuation of this sensibility and a 
dever rendering of an extract from the Phenojnenology. As  do several of his 
Green Gallery propositions, each of the four cubic units comprising the 
Untitled (constructed in sizes ranging from 53.3 cm to 91.4 cm per side, 
depending upon the exhibition space) would meet an average, adult spectator 
somewhere between his or her knees and hips.^^ Once again this suggests that 
Morris spedfically devised these forms to account for the human scale of the 
space in which they are situated. However, apart from this im portant 
perceptual consideration Morris can perhaps be seen responding to a plirase 
from Merleau-Ponty's text in Ms choice of materials for the Untitled. As  stated 
in the Phenomenology:
To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves, 
and they would not do tMs if they could not be Mdden beMnd 
each other or beMnd me. In other words: to look at an object is 
to inhabit it, and from tMs habitation to grasp all things in terms 
of the aspect wMch they present to it. But in so far as I see those 
things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze, and, being 
potentially lodged in them, I already perceive from various 
angles the central object of my present vision. Thus every object 
is the mirror of all others.
Each of Morris's cubes - small boxes made from wood, then laminated with 
reflective Plexiglas - may be seen as completely 'displayed'. As participants 
linger around the Untitled their reflections can also be said 'to inhabit it': legs 
and feet normally attadied to the spectator's body now appear dislocated and
w ithdraw n from its physical conditions. See Robert Morris; The Mind/Body Problem , ex. cat, 
(N ew  York: Solomon R. Guggenheim M useum, 1994), 170.
2 ^ 0  encompass all possible view ing audiences w e could also assum e that these forms would  
meet any spectator-participant, regardless of their ow n 'dimensions', in such a w ay as to 
visibly reflect at least som e portion of their bodies.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 68.
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'lodged* in these cubes themselves. Like the effects of reflection, Morris's use 
of seriality or multiple forms in his work m ay emphasise the interaction 
between each of its elements and the spectator's role as an organising subject 
in these cohesive systems of phenomena. His Untitled (Battered Cubes) (Fig. 4) 
from 1965 formally carries forward an idea initiated in the Mirrored Cubes and 
later addressed in the first part of his "Notes on Sculpture". The importance 
of a w ork’s "single, immediately grasped and constant shape . . . was its 
capacity to subsume all other qualities or properties of the object into a 
'unitary' form", or as Morris suggests: "If the predominant, hieratic nature of 
the unitary form functions as a constant, all these particularizing [sic] 
relations of scale, proportion, etc., are not thereby cancelled. Rather they are 
bound more cohesively and individually together."22
However, Morris does not encourage the experience of unified form 
solely in relation to works composed of several distinct elements. His Untitled 
(Ring with Light) (Fig. 5) of 1965-66 - yet another example of Morris's use of 
painted plywood - operates perhaps more subtly. Described by IVIichael Fried 
as having "an inner, even secret lÜe",23 the piece may be seen - if one follows 
Fried's line of criticism - to affect a viewer by means of an intangible, 
theatrical presence. Yet this interpretation of the Untitled which fixes 
unnecessarily upon Morris's use of a glowing, fluorescent light source may be 
said to lay too m uch emphasis on the anthropomorphic qualities of this 
illumination. In light our knowledge of Morris's production thus far, such an 
orchestration witliin the work itself would seem arguably 'out of character'. 
Instead of as an 'inner presence', the light could be described as one welding 
together the Untitled's two semicircular units. In other words, the glow which 
bisects the work does not emanate from an emerging life-force like a chick
22paice com m ents and quotes Morris's "Notes on Sculpture, Part 1" in Robert Morris: The 
Mind!Body Problem (ex. cat,), 172.
23pried, "Art and Objecthood". Reprinted in Gregory Battcock (ed.). Minimal Art: A Critical 
Anthology (N ew  York: Dutton, 1968); 129.
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hatching from its shell, but rather may suggest from the flame of a welder's 
acetylene light or, although som ewhat fantastic, perhaps a type of 
luminescent glue. Such an interpretation would be far more in keeping with 
Morris’s Minimalist works such as his structures made for the Green Gallery 
and his Mirrored Cubes from 1965. Each of these pieces, however different 
tlieir forms may be, ask to be experienced as wholes or as cohesive entities. 
The effective fusing together of two units in Ring zuith Light could likewise be 
said to constitute a formal consideration extending from Morris's interest in 
perception. As Merleau-Ponty contends, perception is the product of "unified 
experience" and all acts within it can be generalised as forms of "unifying 
activity".24 Thus, in attempting to give some conclusive characterisation of 
this and earlier works, one could again argue that Morris’s production 'elects 
to carry on' some form of phenomenological tradition by emphasising that 
art-experience stems explicitly from a spectator's "own particular point of 
view".25
As early as 1962 and decidedly from late 1964 onward, Morris can be 
seen focusing his production on reformulating the complex organisation of 
exhibition space, its relation to the viewer, and the spectator-participant's role 
as a mobile, perceiving subject. In doing so, he radically redefines the 
traditional, detached character of this individual amidst a field of objects or 
phenomena - a position often regarded as essential to any experience of 
works themselves. Yet within Morris's systems of phenomena, another 
participant can be identified - the artist himself, and it is with such a focus 
that one may now come to terms with several of his later Minimalist artworks 
and the ways in which he may have further utilised phenomenological 
concepts.
24]\4erleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 238. 
25lbid., viii.
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II. The Act of Making and the Artist as a Perceiving Subject
Robert Morris's essay "Anti Form" of 1968 represents a distinct and 
vocal re-direction of the artist's motivations seen before in his written 
commentaries and his formal revisions of the spectator-object relationship. As 
early as 1966, Morris's Minimalist work increasingly engaged itself with a 
variety of materials strikingly different from the smooth, opaque media of 
matte paint and plywood used exhaustively at the Green Gallery and as early 
as 1962. This change in the formal character of liis work may itself be a key to 
understanding M orris's redirected interest in phenomenology and its 
importance for a new dialectic in art practice. As Morris's early propositions, 
such as Untitled (Cloud) and Untitled (Floor Beam), establish an ambiguous and 
complex perceptual dynamic between viewer and work, his later mesh 
constructions and anti-form pieces expand on this Üieme. In addition to his 
concern for a participant's perceptual experience, M orris's products 
demonstrate his own awareness of how an artist interacts with both materials 
and space. This shift in production may reflect a new understanding of 
phenomenological philosophy. In place of his former general, perceptual play 
between objects and subject, Morris could be seen taking Merleau-Ponty's 
example of stripping hum an experience down to its barest element (i.e. 
perception of the world) and transforming it into an isolation of that element 
most characteristic of art practice itself: the process of making.
Among those propositions which demonstrate this new attitude, 
Morris's mesh works produced from 1966 onward arguably show the artist's 
combination of perceptual theory and perhaps Merleau-Ponty's ideas for the 
revision of such. Inspecting Morris's Untitled (Quarter-Round Mesh) (Fig. 6) 
from 1966 and Untitled (Slung Mesh) (Fig. 7) from 1968, it is possible to 
describe how the artist may have translated into form Merleau-Ponty's 
refusal of differences between the nature of 'inner and outer man'. In the
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Phenomenology, he specifically contends: "Truth does not inhabit only the 
'inner man', or more accurately, there is no inner man, man is in the world 
[...]".2  ^One can infer from this statement that Merleau-Ponty believes quite 
literally that, in the process of perception, 'one sees what one gets'. Here 
again we return to the Phenomenology's appraisal of existence versus essence, 
for before any mode of conscious inquiry into its meaning, the material 
facticity of an object asserts itself. As is perhaps seen in Merleau-Ponty's text, 
Morris also obviates any concrete distinctions between inner and outer space 
in Ills steel Untitled (Quarter-Round Mesh). The woven-metai structure of the 
pieces complicates and challenges notions of inside and outside. As a 
spectator interacts with the Quarter-Round Mesh by moving around and near 
it, its hollow centre chamber, as delineated by the boxing of the mesh, 
changes in appearance. From one viewpoint, it appears to simply mark the 
absence of any material; when seen from another angle, closer to the gaUery 
floor, this hollowed portion takes-on a distinct, geometric form of its own. 
Likewise, in approaching Morris's Slung Mesh a spectator has no steady, 
perceptual hold on either the interior or exterior regions of the work. "IVhere 
common sense or logic tell us that any object, according to its very structure, 
should have both inner and outer limits, actual perception refuses these 
presumptions. This work can at times seem both hollow and solid, as well as 
light and heavy. The perceptual ambiguities of these works frustrate, as they 
do in Morris's earlier works from the Green Gallery, a spectator's withdrawal 
from the exhibition environment.27 As a revision of the traditionally detached 
and reflective position of the viewer, Morris insists that, in order to
2^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xi.
^^Additionally, the artist's 1969 w ork  Untitled (U-Channels) and two aluminium Untitled (I- 
Beams) from 1967 and 1968 challenge a fixed awareness of their inner and outer spaces. As 
also seen in both his Qnarter-Ronnd Mesh and Slung Mesh, Morris's U-Channnels exploit the 
effects of alum inium  moiré to confuse the perception of their own substantiality. In his /- 
Beams, Morris offers works w hose open, frame-like structures likewise make them difficult to 
descibe as solid objects.
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experience objects as perceptually multivalent, a person or subject must 
participate with them both visually and physically.
This slippery, perceptual engagem ent w ith M orris's work is 
heightened by his use of steel and aluminium meshes as it is by the use of 
semi-transparent materials in constructions such as Untitled (Nine Fibreglass 
Sleeves) (Fig. 8) from 1967. The membranous quality of these media make any 
conviction of within and without tentative at best.28 Similarly, the artist's 
Untitled (Fibreglass Cloud) (Fig. 9), also from 1967, emphasises the ambiguous, 
hazy materiality unique to this material. Revising the cloud form first used in 
1962 and again in 1964, Morris now creates an object - suspended from the 
ceiling by nylon threads - which because of its medium looks as touchable as 
a pillow yet as ephemeral as fog. In addition to the perceptual lottery initiated 
by Morris's work, the use of visually porous materials calls specific attention 
to the means of these works’ own fabrication. In doing so, Morris revises his 
position as an art practitioner through distilling his products, such as these 
'untitleds', to the basic facts of their own making and Ms role in such making. 
TMs shift from an emphasis on the participant's experience to Morris's 
interaction with the work can be said to relate to Merleau-Ponty's own 
reduction of the properties umque to Ms phenomenological enterprise. The 
Phenomenology begins with such a statement of intent, and it is tMs specific 
motivation voiced by Merleau-Ponty wMch Morris may have used as a model 
for Ms continuous revision of arFs formal dialectic.
In an essay from 1970, Morris specifically seemingly adopts the 
structure of the Phenomenology's introductory chapters and Merleau-Ponty's 
revisiomst dialectic.^^ As Merleau-Ponty describes the need for pMlosopMcal
28ln the case of the works m entioned here, the fibreglass (prepared for Morris as w ell as Eva 
H esse by A egis Fabricatorss in N ew  York) is characterised by what seem s a raw, lucent 
finish. Alternatively Morris used this fibreglass as a base which he then painted over, as in his 
Untitled (Stadium) o f 1967, w hose appearance harks back to the flat, buffed surfaces of his 
numerous plywood pieces.
2%ee Morris, "Some N otes on the Phenomenology of Making".
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revision as the basis of a 'return to phenomena', Morris assumes a similar, 
critical posture relating to the specific context of sixties art production. 
Morris's essay "Some Notes on the Phenomenology of Making" offers a 
written account of the artist's motivations since his early Minimalist work of 
1962. Before the publication of this essay, Morris's anti-form 'style', like that 
seen in his Untitled (Tangle) (Fig. 10) of 1967, primarily attempts to visually 
and perceptually isolate the most characteristic element of art practice: the act 
of making. Through concentrating on the practical, tactile aspects of this 
activity, such as his choice of materials and his interaction with the gallery 
space, Morris uses a philosophy-specific appraisal of perception, while 
remaining conscious of a viewer's own experience of the work. Morris's 
Tangle engages with the viewer both as an object to inspect visually as well as 
a physical presence which shares and interacts with one's personal space. Yet 
perhaps greater than this perceptual activity, Morris's attention to the objecf s 
unique, sensuous materiality highlights the artist's own physical experience 
in its making and the products of this making. In approaching this felt piece - 
with the word 'felt' offering a curious double entendre - a viewer is well- 
aware of how it operates within the gallery space and how the work calls 
attention to its physical 'presentness'; climbing up the wall, as would some 
species of ivy or creeping vine, Morris's Tangle delineates gallery space from a 
participant's space and then combines the two by pushing itself out toward 
the viewer, thus forcing a physical and perceptual reaction. Similarly, the 
artist's Untitled (Tangle) (Fig. 11), also from  1967, appears to be 
commandeering the room's floor space and perhaps growing into its own 
foundation. These works’ loose tendrils of felt and untidy appearances 
suggest that they 'out of control' or have become over-grown, and thus 
threaten to physically infringe upon a participant.^® In his 1968 essay entitled
3(^0me of Morris's later 'felts', such as his Untitled (Six Legs) of 1969, cling more closely to the 
w alls on w hich they are mounted. H owever, an excess of material invariably extends along
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"Anti Form", M om s comments on the basis for these works: "The focus on 
matter and gravity as means [for production] results in forms that were not 
projected in advance. Considerations of ordering are necessarily casual and 
imprecise and unem phasized [...]. D isengagem ent w ith preconceived 
enduring forms and orders for things is a positive assertion." 31 By creating 
works whose contingency is wholly dependent upon viewer interaction and 
environmental factors (i.e. gravity and exhibition space), Morris revises the 
status of the art object whose significance was traditionally predetermined or 
projected onto it in advance of any perceptual participation. As Merleau- 
Ponty suggests about the projection of the a priori: "traditional [philosophical] 
analyses missed the phenomenon of perception." 3?
In a shift away from what was predom inantly a redressing of the 
viewer's perceptual experience, Morris's work from 1968-1969 isolates his 
own manipulation of materials and the perceptual processes inherent in art- 
making as a product in itself. Witnessed as early as in his Steam (Fig. 12) from 
1967, Morris can be seen allowing the nature of his chosen media to dictate 
the over-aU, completed form of his work. In this piece, installed permanently 
in 1974 at Western Washington University, USA, Morris organises a series of 
steam outlets beneath a bed of stones so that a continuous flow of mist will 
glide across the face of the rocks. Its extremely nebulous character reinforces 
the shift in Morris’s work from using stable to higlily unpredictable media so 
as to emphasise their very basic or elemental nature. This reduction is 
specifically articulated in his essay "Some Notes on the Phenomenology of 
Making", where Morris possibly responds to the structure of Merleau-Ponty's 
introduction to the Phenomenology in order to revise traditional practice wliich
the floorboards in such a w ay as to potentially entangle a specatator's feet. For extended  
discussions of the artist's later felt works, see Robert Morris: Recent Felt Pieces and Draivings, ex. 
cat. (Hannover: Kunstverein, 1997) and Pepe Karmel, Robert Morris: The Felt Works, ex. cat. 
(New York: Grey Art Gallery and Study Centre, 1989).
3lM orris, "Anti Form", Artjbnim, 6, no. 8 (April 1968), 33-35. Reprinted in Morris, 46. 
32Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 3.
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has occasionally obscured the evidence of an artist's activity from the 
products themselves. Morris begins: "A variety of structural fixes have been 
imposed on art [...]. Whatever else art is, at a very simple level it is a way of 
making [...] a close look at the nature of art making rem ains to be 
undertaken."33 Whilst quoting a collection of contemporary sources to 
support his various comments on the concept of 'a rt as behaviour', Morris 
may again look to the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty initiates his own 
discussion of the dangers of fixes imposed on philosophy by entitling his 
introduction "Traditional Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena". Perhaps 
like M orris's essay, this introductory section acts as a manifesto for all 
subsequent remarks regarding his revision of perception (or as in Morris's 
case, the re-appraisal of art practice). This introduction describes Merleau- 
Ponty's motivations for exploring perception within ourselves in order to 
"understand sense experience" of the objective world.34 Morris's essay also 
asserts the need to inspect the basic process of art production itself in order to 
obviate all other intellectualised (and aestheticised) constructs attached to it. 
As he states: "Much attention has been focused on the analysis of the content 
of art making - its end images - but there has been little attention focused on 
the significance of the means." 35 Adding to this and using a vocabulary not 
unfamiliar ot phenomenological theory, Morris continues: "This extended 
profile [of art making] is composed of a complex of interactions involving 
factors of bodily possibility, the nature of materials and physical laws, the 
temporal dimensions of process and perception, as well as resultant static
images." 36
Among those anti-form, process-based works wliich best illustrate 
Morris's revised motivations for production, the artist's Continuous Project
33jviorris, "Some N otes on the Phenomenology of Making". Reprinted in Morris, 71. 
34Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 12.
35Morris, "Some N otes on the Phenom enology of Making". Reprinted in Morris, 75. 36lbid.
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Altered Daily (Fig. 13), executed between 1 -22  December, 1969, stands-out as 
his most exhaustive appraisal of a perception-sensitive approach to art- 
making. Expanding upon earlier 'free-form' propositions such as Untitled 
(Threadwaste) (Fig. 14) and Untitled (Dirt) (Fig. 15), both from 1968, this project 
may represent Morris's extended engagement with phenomenological ideas.
As seen in his work since 1962 and in his related essays, Morris's initial 
motivation for production can be seen as a conscious re-assessment and 
complication of the spectator/ object relationship. Now, as witnessed in both 
this multi-part project presented at Leo Castelli's New York 'Warehouse' and 
his later texts, the artist's attention is seen to have shifted toward an 
awareness of his own experience. Morris continuously developed this work 
on-site at the CasteUi gallery over the course of 21 days, during which tune he 
added, m anoeuvred and flung a variety of raw  m aterials w ithin the 
warehouse space, including asbestos, clay, earth, cotton, grease, water, felt, 
tiireadwaste, and electric lights. Similar to the characteristics of Threadwaste 
and Dirt, this piece's multiple layers and rather transient nature emphasise 
Morris's own changing interaction with the materials themselves. Not only 
does a viewer's experience of the piece become a challenge for their attention 
span and a constant re-situating of the self in relation to it, bu t the artist's 
'hand' or presence in this process is evident through the work's physical 
metamorphoses. This aspect of the work, complimented by the artist's |
writings and their continuous engagement with ideas relating to perception, I
suggest that Morris not only may have been aware of phenomenological |
itheory but also of Merleau-Ponty's work itself. These changed motivations, iIapparent in both his production and essays after 1967, are in their own right a |
form of revision. From re-appraising the conditions of a spectator's |
perception in his early Minimalist work, Morris goes on to produce work |
refining his own notions about art making. As the act of making is the base I
for all art practice (and therefore the result of a reduction of such), Morris's !
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Minimalist work during from the 1960s could be understood to mirror a 
num ber of the same issues which are central to the contemporary 
phenomenological enterprise.
At the base of the Phenomenology of Perception is a reduction of human 
experience bound to an objective world, or as Merleau-Ponty terms it, to a 
world of phenomena. This text sets forth such experiences as its subject of 
rev ision  in  o rder to repair those trad itiona l prejudices against 
phenomenological philosophy which had obscured the fact that perception 
occurs in a necessarily pre-cognitive and un-reflective state of being. These 
issues bear resemblance to those addressed in the work and writings of 
Robert Morris, yet they relate now to the context of American art in the 1960s 
and specifically to an artistic sphere formerly dominated by the successes of 
the Abstract Expressionists. Morris's revision of art practice not only attempts 
to reduce all that is synthetic in a viewer's reception of art, such as private 
intellectualisation which takes place once-removed from the work itself, but" 
also articulates this through his own appraisal of what it means to produce 
such work. This possible phenomenological sensibility dominates Morris's 
entire production from 1962 until 1970. Additionally, the artist's writings 
from this period attempt to revise contemporary art criticism and to reclaim it 
from those critics, such as Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, who were 
physically, and thus phenomenologically, detached from art making itself. 
Bearing this evidence in mind, one can see Morris’s commitment not only to 
the revision of how works of art may influence or perhaps even determine 
their exhibition contexts, but also the commitment throughout his disparate 
and provocative production to redefine both his own and the viewer’s 
understanding of their unique perceptual situation in the world.
4Chapter
Richard Serra: Diversifying Art Experience
Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and 
thinks of the object-in-general, m ust re tu rn  to the 'there is’ 
which underlies it; to the site, the soü of the sensible and opened 
world such as it is in our life and for our body
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty
In this comment taken from one of his later essays entitled 'Eye and 
M ind', M erleau-Ponty opposes once again the Cartesian separation 
between the m ind (which we may term the 'cogito') and the world of 
people and things (both termed 'phenomena') which the m ind inhabits 
via the body - a task concerning Merleau-Ponty through the whole of the 
Phenom enology. As previously discussed, he similarly argues that the 
subject or what one could caU 'the perceiver' is not a pure thinker, as 
Descartes supposes in  his M editations, b u t is ra th e r "incarnate 
subjectivity"2 or an  em bodied consciousness. Yet g reater still, this 
statement emphasises the limitless character of the domain of perception 
addressed by phenomenology; 'the soil of the sensible' or 'opened world' 
is in contrast to Descartes' world from which he has "detached the subject, 
or consciousness" and where the subject "could not possibly apprehend 
anything else as existing unless (it) first of all experienced (itself) in the act 
of apprehending it".3 Bringing together these two ideas - that the 
embodied, perceiving subject is also one who navigates through a complex
W ierleau-Ponty, 'Eye and Mind', trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primaa/ of Perception and 
Other Essays, James M. Edie, ed. (Evanston; N orthwestern University Press, 1964), 160-1. 
Q uoted  in Langer, M erleau-P onty's "Phenomenology o f Perception": A  Guide and  
Commentary, (London: M acmillan Press, 1989), xi. O riginally written in  1960, Merleau- 
Ponty's essay w as published posthumously.
2 Langer, xv.
3Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1962), ix.
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and pre-reflective world of sensation and experience - Merleau-Ponty 
proposes that hum an perception can only be assessed once immersed into 
the everyday or as he says, 'such as it is in our life'. In other words, his 
position in the Phenomenology is one "in favour of a concern with the 
world of our actual, lived experience" and not with the comparatively 
abstract investigations of Cartesian philosophy - an approach which 
ultimately "[masks] the origin of reflection".^
Bringing Merleau-Ponty's attitude toward the inexhaustible world 
to bear once again on M inimalist art practice, a m arkedly different 
discussion from that found in the preceding chapter may now  develop 
around how the artist Richard Serra relates to such phenomenological 
themes and around his approach to the creation of diverse artworks which 
emphasise the spectator-object relationship. Such a survey will also be 
joined by a reading of several of the artist's writings which were produced 
alongside these works betw een 1966 and 1980. Stemming from this 
analysis, we may not only explore the extent to whicli Serra's project can 
be spoken about in phenomenological terms, bu t we can also elaborate on 
his work's relation to the wider context and concerns of the Minimalist 
'movement' at that time.
I. Formal Diversity In Serra's Early Work
The disparate character of Richard Serra’s early sculpture from 
between 1966 and 1970 could be seen as an express product of the artist's 
interest in laying bare the activity of art making and its physical effects on 
both artist and viewer alike, much as was discovered in Robert Morris's 
later works such as his Dirt (Fig. 15) of 1968 and Continuouos Project 
Altered Daily (Fig. 13) of 1969. Through highlighting his propositions' own
4Langer, xiv and xv.
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means of production. Serra can be seen fostering a physical awareness of 
media and the artist's movement as the main point of contact between his 
work and its audience. This trend in his production coud be interpreted as 
a phenomenological awareness similar to themes discovered in Merleau- 
Ponty’s text, and one which can be explored in greater depth through a 
reading of Serra's 1967-1968 writing, "Verb List" .5 In what could be loosely 
called a journal of activity and movement. Serra reduces and condenses 
the process of art-making to a list of more than one hundred actions and 
their effects upon his chosen materials or his artworks themselves;
to split to spread
to cut to hang
to sever to collect
to drop of tension
to remove of gravity
to simplify of entropy [...].6
Each of his entries in this so-called diary helps contribute to an overall 
sense of the artist's m ethod of working. The list also emphasises the 
heterogeneity of his 'art-process'which specifically calls attention to Serra's 
shifting from activity to activity and perhaps from m aterial to material 
during production. Yet, although it could be termed a rather conceptual 
list which encourages a reader to envisage or mentally recreate Serra's 
activities, one also begins by way of this list to understand of the artist's 
activity as an extremely tactile and physically engaging process. One could 
therefore argue that this writing attem pts to operate on a somewhat 
phenom enological level; rather than by way of various intellectual 
analyses. Serra offers the reader a view of his work which accentuates its 
sentient or tangible qualities. To highlight this text's phenomenological
^First published in "The N ew  Avant-Garde, Issues for the Art of the Seventies" (n.p., 
1972). Reprinted in Richard Serra, W ritings/Interview s  (Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1994), 3-4.
6 Ibid., 3.
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tenor, it m ay prove helpful to reassert a suggestion from  the 
Phenomenology:  "The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I 
am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with 
it, but I do not possess it; it is in e x h a u s tib le .A lth o u g h  it would be 
dangerously speculative to securely link M erleau-Ponty's text to Serra’s 
writing solely on the basis of their similarity, we may nevertheless like to 
begin reading phenomenologically several of the artist's works made 
between 1966 and 1970. Just as Serra's "Verb List" magnifies the activity 
and experience of art production in its own right, many of the artist's early 
'minimal' artw orks can also be described as emphasising their own 
materiality as a means by which a spectator may enter into a complex 
physical and perceptual dialogue with these diverse forms and their 
varied exhibition contexts.
Serra's earliest, rough-hewn pieces such as his Doors (Fig. 16) of 
1966-1967, could be interpreted as the formal products of those activities 
which the artist documents in his "Verb List", and could be linked to 
phenomenology's body-centred theories of perception. Much as Merleau- 
Ponty 's Phenomenology  emphasises, Serra's artw orks highlight the 
centrality of the body to perception, not simply as a m ediator between 
m ind and world bu t as the origin of connections made between it and 
objective experience. Serra may be seen illustrating this concept most 
specifically through his choice of materials and the methods by which he 
forms and m anipulates such m edia tow ard exhibitable 'ends'. For 
example, the artist's Doors have a distinct, coarse texture which is not only 
visible but also invites touch. Although such contact is rarely possible 
within traditional art spaces, Serra's use of rubber and fibreglass here may 
not only call attention to the artist's 'splitting', 'severing' and 'spreading' 
of these media but may also elicit from spectators a similar engagment
^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xvi-xvii.
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with the materials, although it is not traditionally allowed by museums or 
galleries. The body's role in these works is one which we can see 
advocated in Merleau-Ponty's text:
C onsciousness is being-tow ards-the-th ing  through the 
intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the 
body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it 
into its 'world', and to move one's body is to aim at things 
through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, 
which is made upon it independently of any representation.^
The artist's rubber and fibreglass forms, leaning against the walls of the 
gallery space, can be understood as doors' if one looks for the underlying 
structures which Serra has used, However, the physical lure to be touched 
which is arguably sent out by these materials acts first upon the body and 
could be seen as "made upon it independently" of what these forms 
represent. Similarly in relation to Serra's Belts (Fig. 17), also from 1966- 
1967, a visitor's first approach toward the work is dom inated by the 
perception of sprawling organic forms. Perhaps only later does one gain an 
explicit awareness of the so-called 'belts'. Once again Serra's use of rubber - 
in this instance, vulcanised rubber^ as well as blue neon tubing - generates 
a highly tangible quality and allows the artist to define the work's 
exhibition context through the visitor's relation to i t  Much as with Robert 
Morris’s felt 'tangles' from 1967 (Figs. 10 and 11), Serra's rubber strips may 
be seen invading and re-establishing the boundaries of its participant's 
personal space, while its suspended blue neon tubing possibly alludes to 
industrial work such as welding, as does Morris's Untitled (Ring with 
Light) (Fig. 5) from 1965-1966, Such an effect, again, may be in keeping w ith  
M erleau-Ponty 's revised definition of h um an  percep tion . As he
Sibid., 138-9.
^The vulcanisation of rubber is a chemical process which renders the substance more e lastic , 
then a llow ing it to harden into a desired shape. This w ould  have perm itted Serra to 
achieve the results seen in Belts.
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comments: "I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; 
I belong to them, my body combines w ith them  and includes them. The 
scope of this inclusion is the measure of that of my existence In
constructing an intimate dialogue between the spectator's body and his 
Be/fs by means of their form and texture. Serra may be extending to art 
practice the power to affect and sculpt human perception itself.
In addition to concentrating on the perceptual experiences of many 
museum and gallery visitors coming in contact with his work. Serra also 
emphasises the literal, formal recording of his own activity in the works 
themselves, just as he documented these processes in his "Verb List". This 
transformation of action into product may be seen explicitly in the artist's 
To Lift (Fig. 18) from 1967. Using vulcanised rubber. Serra freezes as a 
momento of his practice yet another action which may be found in his list 
of verbs from 1967-1968; 'to lift' acts both as this work's title as well as its 
means of production. With vulcanisation rendering the rubber highly 
malleable during its formation, the artist simply needed 'to lift' the 
material toward the ceiling - while wearing a protective, heat-resistant 
glove - to achieve its final, solidified state. Yet To Lift 's soft, tent-like 
shape again brings a spectator into a perceptual dialogue w ith  this 
proposition 's unique m ateriality. A lthough the piece has noticeably 
hardened due to the final stage of the vulcanisation process, its surface 
appears velvet-like and appeals to the visitor's touch. This balance which 
Serra establishes between the documentation of his own activity and an 
interest in a participant's perceptual engagement with the work may be 
found again in his Double Roll (Fig. 19) from 1968 and other rolled-lead 
works such as his Slow Roll: For Philip Glass, also from 1968. The uneven.
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 140.
^^Serra arguably exercises this power in other, similar rubber pieces' made during the mid 
sixties. Most notable am ong these are his works Chunk, Triangle Belt Piece and Wh i t e  
Neon Belt Piece, each from 1967, w hose seductive textural qualities could invite physical 
contact.
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crimped rings formed by the artist's rolling of lead sheets, just as one 
would scroll a poster or a carpet into the form of a cylinder, emphasises 
the fact that they were manipulated by his own hands rather than solely by 
machine. This formal recording of Serra's m ovem ent could relate to 
Merleau-Ponty's comments on the role of the hum an being in sculpting 
his or her perceivable environment;
It is never our objective body that we move, bu t our 
phenomenal body, and there is no mystery in that, as the 
potentiality of this or that part of the world, surges toward 
objects to be grasped and perceives them. In the same way [a 
person] has no need to look for a theatre of action and a space 
in which to deploy these concrete movements: the space is 
given to him in the form of the world as this moment [...].^2
Alternatively said, the bodies with which both  Serra and the spectator- 
participant engage with the world - a world fully present and without 
mystery - should be understood as feeling, seeing and all-perceiving bodies 
which can experience objects on several perceptual levels. Acting as a 
register of Serra's rolling process. Double Roll also offers an intriguing 
perceptual project to the visitor. These rolls' bent, elliptical edges recede 
into and protrude from the work like a freshly opened tin can. Generally, 
anyone who has experienced the sharp perforations of an opened can 
knows the potential danger similarly present in Serra's Double Roll, At 
close range these forms appear as if they could cut a spectator's limbs quite 
severely if they did not alter their physical relation to the work and its 
sp a c e .L ik e w ise  Serra's Casting (Fig. 20), a lead piece m ade in 1969
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 106.
^^This aggressive, even dangerous character of som e M inimalist work has been described by 
Anna Chave and Malcolm Miles as one its m ost d istinguish ing features. In both Chave's 
and M iles's arguments they refer more specifically to Serra's later, steel structures, such as 
his Tilted Arc, w hich w ill be discussed later in this thesis. For these discussions of the 
specific, violent tendencies of som e M inimalist art, see Anna C. Chave, "Minimalism and 
the Rhetoric of Power", Arts Magazine, Vol. 64, N o. 5 (January 1990), 44-63, and Malcolm  
M iles, Art For Public Places: Critical Essays (Winchester: W inchester School of Art Press, 
1989).
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expressly for the W hitney Museum of American Art, New York, also 
demands a certain am ount of concerted navigation on the participant's 
part.i^ By allowing hot, malleable lead to cool at the m eeting point 
between the wall and the floor. Serra creates forms which appear opaque 
and brittle, much like muddied ice, as well as potentially sharp if shattered 
by passing feet. The crumbs of lead which lie on the floor surrounding this 
piece could be the traces of such mishaps, may prom ote a view er's 
awareness of their ow n body and its relation to the artwork. Such 
adjustments to the objective world which we inhabit are constant. As 
Merleau-Ponty suggests: "[we] witness every minute the miracle of related 
experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is 
worked, for we are ourselves this network of r e l a t i o n s h i p s .Merleau- 
Ponty also speaks further about the role of the senses in the mapping out 
of objects and the larger world they inhabit:
The senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of 
[things]. One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and 
when with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by 
the visible glass. One sees the springiness of steel, [...] the 
softness of shavings. The form of objects is not their geometrical 
shape: it stands in relation to their specific nature, and appeals 
to all our other senses as well as sight.
The formal diversity which characterises the whole of Serra's early 
îvlinimalist production can be conceived as the product of a unique, highly 
physical approach to creating spectator-object relationships w ithin 
intimate exhibition spaces. W hether through the brittleness of Casting,
^^Serra first experim ented w ith  this casting technique in his Splashing,  a work initially  
created in  a N ew  York studio ow ned by the painter Japser Johns and later reconstructed at 
Leo Castelli's N ew  York Warehouse in 1968. Like the artist's Casting, this piece involved  
the throwing of hot, liquified lead onto a room's baseboards, then allow ing it to cool and 
m old to its underlying structure. For a discussion of other Minimalist artists who adopted  
similar m ethods during the 1960s, see Mi won Kwon, "One Place After Another: N otes on 
Site Specificity", October, 80 (Spring 1997), 85-110.
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xx.
^^Ibid., 229.
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through the hardness of the workDoors, or through the softness of hisT o 
Lift, Serra affects a participant's awareness of these pieces by attending to 
formal qualities which may be experienced by nearly all the senses - an 
im portant aspect of human perception to which the Phenomenology and 
the artist's "Verb List" also attend. However, during 1968 Serra began 
experimenting almost exclusively - the only exception being Casting from 
1969 - with the propping of heavy forms against one another and against 
various surfaces. The heavy, almost massive, quality of these 'props' 
marks Serra's embrace of a larger scale in his work as well as an inclusion 
of tremendously labour-intensive industrial materials such as steel, lead 
antimony^^ and concrete. Works such as his Prop (Fig. 21) from 1968 could 
be seen as examining the effects of weight, m aterial and gravity on a 
spectator's perception of the work. Against one of the museum 's gallery 
walls. Serra has oriented a large lead plate and pole in such a way as to 
give the effect that one form is essentially 'propping up' the other. In 
actuality the metal square has been fastened securely to the wall, yet the 
resulting piece could nonetheless produce a momentary anxiousness in 
the viewer - a direct consequence of this work's improbable balance of its 
two heavy forms. In addition to this perceptual 'trick', the evidence of 
Serra's personal role in manufacturing Prop is recorded on its surfaces in 
such a way as to also possibly elicit from a participant the desire to touch 
and physically locate its varied textures. The smeared, buffed and scratched 
marks covering every part of the work act as literal documents of Serra's 
rolling, sliding and refining of Prop during its production. Once again, 
each of these activities may be seen as extensions of Serra's early "Verb 
List", itself a document of his artistic methods. Yet as much as these marks 
and traces alert a viewer to Serra's own m anipulation of materials, the
 ^^ 'Lead antimony' is an alloy made by combining lead and the white, metallic element 
antimony, which when made part of an alloy gives it both a lustrous appearance and a 
brittle com position.
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work ultimately stands on its own during exhibition and m ust relate 
specifically to a participant's understanding of both gallery and personal 
spaces. Serra's handling of marks and materials may likewise be seen in 
his work Right Angle Prop (Fig. 22) from 1969, a lead piece which similarly 
exposes evidence of the artist's activity as one of its prim ary points of 
engagement. Much as is in Serra's earlier Prop, this piece can offer viewers 
an anxious moment of perceived danger; its large lead plate, measuring 
just under 2 x 2  metres, appears to be precariously held in place by a 
smaller, sledge-like lead rectangle. Just as in the 1968 prop work, this 
hulking sheet of metal has in fact been secured to the wall, yet a 
participant has no way of knowing that the work is truly more stable than 
it first appears. Such an effect combined with the soft, lustrous sheen of 
the lead arguably helps to create two levels on which a participant may 
engage with the work: firstly he or she may interested in Serra's specific 
activity and handling of the materials, and secondly he or she may relate 
directly to this 'prop ' as a sensuous, perceptually complex, and perhaps 
even dangerous object.
One may similarly interpret Serra's handling and alignment oi One 
Ton Prop (House O f  Cards) (Fig. 23), a lead work m ade in 1969, as a 
conscious attem pt to disrupt a viewer's awareness of the work's weight, 
structural stability and textural qualities, each effect appealing differently 
to our senses. Just over one metre high on each side, this work does not 
command the space that a proposition such as Serra's Doors from 1966- 
1967 would; it is similar to Robert Morris's Untitled (Mirrored Cubes) (Fig. 
3) or his Green Gallery works (Fig. 1) in terms of scale, because each meets 
the visitor near hip or thigh level and sets into motion the chance for 
close, physical contact. In addition to its size. One Ton Prop's visual 
appearance or 'texture' invites touch, just as his other lead works strike a 
balance betw een enhancing a viewer's awareness both of surface and
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structure. Yet also during 1969, Serra can be seen beginning to move away 
from such works which are primarily designed to be placed within 
decidely intimate gallery spaces.
His massive, hot-rolled steel work Skullcracker Stacking Series: 
Stacked Steel Slabs (Fig. 24) from the same year redefines the physical 
limits in which Serra is typically seen to work. This piece is significantly 
different from his other works in that this structure is actually dangerous, 
whereas several of Serra's propped pieces simply appear dangerous when 
in fact they are securely displayed. This sense of danger is wholly a 
function of its m aterials and scale; constructed at the Kaiser Steel 
Corporation in Fontana, California, these slabs have been stacked in such a 
way as to avoid collapse merely by a m atter of centimetres. Serra's 
calculation of the effects of this weight and measurements could be seen to 
increase his own physical interaction with the piece as well as increase the 
involvem ent of those assisting him. The variety of perceptual and 
physical dem ands placed on the viewer by these slabs have also, as 
mentioned, now been consciously removed by Serra from a gallery space 
which would restrict the experience of his work. With this break from the 
traditional context of art exhibition and reception. Serra repositions 
perceptual engagement with his works in diverse settings other than those 
of the m useum  of gallery. Serra explores this idea further, and on a 
massive scale, in a number of steel and concrete works executed during 
1970 and after, as will now be seen in a joint discussion of the artist's 
artworks and writings from this period.
II. Contextual Diversity in Serra's Work After 1970
Merleau-Ponty suggests in Iris Phenomenology that "to have a body 
is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of perceptual
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unfolding and of all those inter-sensory correspondences which lie beyond 
the segment of the world which we are actually p e r c e i v i n g . " IS Serra's
large, outdoor pieces begun in New York during 1970 we can arguably 
w itness a sim ilar sensitivity  to the diversity  of lived experience 
mentioned by Merleau-Ponty and which acts as the central characteristic of 
the phenomenological world he addresses. In looking at a work such as 
Serra's To Encircle Base Plate Hexagram, Right Angles Inverted (Fig. 25) 
from 1970, we enter into a perceptual event very different from those we 
have seen in the artist's other artworks. This large steel piece, embedded 
into a desolate city street, deep in the Bronx, New York, is awash with 
sensations, noises and possibly even odours one would not expect to 
encounter w ithin the confines of the m useum . In other words, the 
perceptible elements of its scene can constantly change: cars may come and 
go, as naturally can residents and visitors on foot. Yet, one thing does 
remain constant in the work - the steel ring embedded in the street itself. 
In fact this ring is ever-present and could be looked upon as, as much a 
part of this Bronx neighbourhood as the apartm ent blocks and business 
which surround it, eventhough it is consciously posed as an artistic 
proposition. In this way. To Encircle Base Plate Hexagram is at once 'a t 
hom e' here as well as out-of-place in this context, eventhough its 
manhole-like shape and material are familiar in an urban setting. Thus, 
one could suggest that the perceptual play between foreign and familiar 
results in an intriguing, reflexive dialogue betw een a spectator's 
expectations of the artwork and what he or she actually perceives.
Although installed in a very different location, Serra's Pulitzer  
Piece: Stepped Elevation (Figs. 26a and 26b) - a 1970-1971 piece placed in St. 
Louis, Missouri - also possibly sets into motion a perceptual exercise which 
we can discuss in tandem with Serra's 1970-1972 work Shift (Figs. 27a and
I8[bid., 326.
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27b), a piece installed in a large field outside King City, Ontario. We could 
in terpret both  works by relating it to a num ber of ideas from the 
Phenom enology  and by describing the rising and falling of these works' 
elements over varied terrains. As Rosalind Krauss suggests in an essay 
which responds specifically to S h if t  "the work marks the activity of the 
view er's relationship to his world; all this flows - w ith breathtaking 
naturalness, from the Phenomenology of Perception.” *^^  Krauss's rather 
literal phenomenological interpretation could also be applied to Serra's 
Pulitzer Piece, if we take into accormt the way in which its own forms can 
be seen to shift in appearance when visitors traverse its spaces. This 
Pontean interpretation may again be reinforced by a reading of Serra's 
essay entitled "Shift" in conjunction w ith  the works. As the artist 
comments:
What I wanted was a dialectic between one's perception of the 
place in totality and one's relation to the field as walked. The 
result is a way of measuring oneself against the indeterminacy 
of the land.^0
One could arguably relate Serra's description of his practice to the 
suggestions put forth by Merleau-Ponty in his own text. One may also 
relate this phenomenological approach to art making to another of Serra's 
steel works, such as Spin Out: For Bob S m ith so n  (Fig. 28) from 1972-73, As 
he did for his work Shift, Serra again verbally addresses the issues with 
which he was concerned during the making of this piece. As he describes 
in an interview with the critic Liza Bear: "I think the significance of the 
work is in its effort [...]. And that effort is a state of mind, an activity, an
^^Rosaiind Krauss, "Richard Serra, a Translation." Originally written for the catalogue of 
the Richard Berra exhibition at the Centre Georges Pom pidou, Paris (October-December 
1983). Reprinted in Krauss, The Originality of  the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist 
M y th s  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 267.
^^Reprinted in Serra, Writings! Interviews, 11.
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interaction w ith the w o r l d / '^ l  Such an active, physical interaction w ith 
the context of Spin Out at the Rijksmuseum Krôeller-Müller in Otterlo 
could remind one of Merleau-Ponty's description of walking the streets of 
Paris or w alking in the coun tryside . As he explains in the 
Phenomenology:  "Not only have I a physical world, not only do I live in 
the midst of earth, air and water, I have around me roads, plantations, 
villages, streets, churches, implements Spin Out has also been
installed in a rather pastoral setting; the trees could be seen to interact w ith 
the participant just as much as the work does, with its rolled-steel plates 
p ro trud ing  into a v isitor's pa th  and directing his or her physical 
relationship with it.
This m indful placement of works w ithin settings which can by 
visited by a variety of people becomes, with the installation of Serra's 1976- 
1980 Wright's Triangle (Fig. 29), perhaps the most pronounced feature of 
the artist's large-scale public works created in the late 1970s. Tliis work, 
placed at the meeting point of two pathw ays at W estern W ashington 
University in Bellingham, USA, could be said to actively participate in 
daily, university life. For example: students hurrying between classes may 
have the opportunity to move and walk inside of Wright's Triangle; with 
the weather perpetually changing in this particular part of the north­
western United States, it is likely that rain puddles would collect here, and 
change the experience of the massive steel work when it is explored on 
foot. The placement of this work next to the footpaths could feasibly relate 
to a point made by Merleau-Ponty near the end of the Phenom enology : 
"Man is but a network of relationships, and these alone matter to him."23 
Serra's proposition Tertninal (Fig. 30) of 1977, could also act as a nexus
 ^^"Document: Spin Out '72-73", an interview w ith Liza Bear. Originally published in 
A va lan ch e ,  Sum m er/Fall 1973. Reprinted in Serra, ibid., 15.
^^Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 347.
23lbid., 456.
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point for such networks. This large steel tower acts as a marker between 
the rail lines near the Hauptbahnhof, or train station, in the German town 
of Bochum, Not only could one call this work a perceptual sign post for 
those who walk by it, but the tower could also appear much different - 
perhaps completely different - to a person passing by it while on board a 
train or tram. Thus, Terminal establishes a decidedly malleable, perceptual 
relationship between itself and its spectators, who in this case could be 
anyone travelling in its shadow.
A similar, large-scale propped tower, entitled T.W.U, (Figs. 30a and 
30b), was this time installed in downtown New York, near Soho, during 
1980-1982. Seen from various angles, depending upon which way one 
travels along the surrounding streets, tliis steel leviathan commands not 
only the vision of all who pass by, but also insists upon the conscious 
orientation of a pedestrian's movement. Although this is achieved here ty  
requiring pedestrians to navigate around the work. Serra also achieves 
this type of engagement with his St. John's Rotary Arc (Figs. 31a and 31b), 
installed at the Holland Tunnel Rotary, or 'roundabout', in New York 
between 1980 and 1988. Pedestrians, too, may traverse this site, bu t the 
most striking accounts of this work come from those who experience it by 
travelling around the Arc  by car. As Serra comments in his 1980 essay 
entitled "St. John's Rotary Arc":
I have always thought of the Rotary as being a turntable, a 
cartw heel, a bottleneck  extension, a co n tin u a tio n  and 
completion of the New Jersey Turnpike, a highway roundabout 
at the exit of the Holland Tunnel [...] a place where cars 
continually turn  and cross lanes in apprehension of changing 
directions as they enter New York [...], a place polluted by 
exhaust fumes, a scene of incessant change 24
24"St. John's Rotary Arc", first published in Artfoinim, September 1980. Reprinted in Serra, 
Ibid., 119.
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This incessant change, or what Merleau-Ponty could presum ably term 
'flux', helps to define the site as m uch as the immense steel arc itself, 
planted directly in the m iddle of the rotary, assists in defining it. Yet, 
perhaps Serra's most famous steel work, his Tilted Arc (Figs. 33a and 33b) 
of 1981, was eventually destroyed precisely because of such a public 
presence. A fter a long and  heated  series of court hearings, the 
Government Services Administration (the organisation who, in fact, first 
commissioned the work) had the arc, measuring more than 36 meters in 
length, destroyed on March 15, 1989.25 Many complaints were made about 
how the work, installed in the Federal Plaza, New York, interfered and 
perhaps even hindered activities normally taking place in the space it 
occupied Other complaints were made about how it was an 'eye sore' for 
those working in the surrounding area, and about how it did noticing to 
assert that it was an actual art object rather than an unfinished industrial 
project. From ground and street levels,.however, the problems with Tilted  
Arc's placement were not always clear. Serra himself, speaking in defence 
of the work at the public hearings wliich decided its fate, m entioned that 
G.S.A.'s proposal to simply relocate the work would not be appropriate, for 
Tilted Arc was designed expressly for the space it occupied. Thus, moving 
it to an alternate site of exliibition would essentially take away one of the 
elements originally intended to define the Arc. Similar though less severe 
complaints have been made regarding Serra's 1981 piece Gedenkstdtte  
Goslar (Fig. 32), sited directly in front of an old gate in the city of Goslar, 
Germany. Serra's installation of the steel work in this position does not 
render the passageway unusable, but it does require pedestrian traffic to 
make some minor adjustments to the gate itself. Once again, as seen in
25por full discussions of the events leading up to and follow ing the destruction of Tilted Arc, 
see D ouglas Crimp, "Serra's Public Sculpture: Redefining Site Specificity", in Ernst- 
Gerhard Güse, Richard Serra, ex. cat. (N ew  York:Rizzoli, 1987); Clara Weyergraf-Serra 
and Martha Buskirk, Rzc/zrtrd Serra's Tilted  /i,rc(n.p.: Van Abbesmuseum, 1998);idem., T//É? 
Destruction of Tilted Arc Documents (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
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several of his artw orks from this time, the a rtis t 's  concern for 
manipulating urban space to positive and intriguing ends finds expression 
in often unassuming, simple structures such as seen in his Gedenkstdtte 
Goslar.
As has already been made clear, however, we need not look simply 
to Richard Serra's later works to find his engagement with the problems 
and possibilities of perception on an artistic level. From his earliest 
artworks of the 1960s to his somewhat infamous Tilted Arc  of 1981, Serra's 
sculptural project has arguably been engaged with issues of perception, and 
has produced unique spectator experiences and diverse contexts in which 
these perceptual dram as could unfold. This engagem ent m ay be 
particularly evident in his shift from working exclusively in interior or 
private exhibition spaces to exploring urban, rural and other public 
contexts. Yet, whether or not Serra can be said to directly address and 
reflect a first-hand knowledge of Maurice M erleau-Ponty's notion of 
perception is still unclear. Indeed, the artist's work can be singularly 
difficult to interpret, and attempting to locate evidence of one or any 
number of specific sources for his production in the works themselves is 
often frustrating. Bearing this in mind, we may now like to look more 
closely at the w ritten evidence for the complex and varied ideas which 
drive Serra's production.
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Chapter 5
Sources, Texts and Interpretation: Using Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology of Perception in the Criticism of Minimalist
Sculpture
The interpretation and analysis of Minimalist sculpture has, since its 
emergence, always been a complex and, at times, strenuous project. It has 
perhaps been made more difficult by the association of certain texts - most 
especially, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology o f  Perception - with 
the artworks or so-called 'primary structures' of artists such as Robert 
Morris and Richard Serra. This difficulty could be said to arise from the 
hegemonic insistance that Minimalism can find its definite, almost 
singular origins in this text. In fact, the critic Rosalind Krauss has 
specifically spoken of Minimalist art itself as a form of phenomenology in 
its own right. ^  Yet to speak about Minimalism as a phenomenology is very 
different from speaking about it in phenomenological terms. The present 
discussion of the artworks of Morris and Serra has, thus far, endeavoured 
to speak phenomenologically about these artists' practices and not to treat 
them as independent forms of ontological philosophy. It has also related a 
num ber of M erleau-Ponty's comments on hum an experience and 
perception to their works, for Ms theory has been proposed by several 
critics to be the source for these and other Minimalist artists' ideas 
concerning the relation between their objects and perception.
One would assume, then, that substantial evidence for tMs 
partnersMp between Merleau-Ponty's theory and Morris's and Serra's 
work would be available in their sculpture and perhaps in their writings. 
However, as we have witnessed thus far, such evidence is anything but
' This point is accentuated by Hal Foster in The Return of the Real, 42. Krauss's Passages in 
Modern Sculpture, the text on which this comment is based, w ill be discussed more 
thoroughly later in this conclusion.
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obvious or substantial. In order to explore just why such evidence is 
lacking and to assess its ramifications, we can again look at selected 
artworks and writings by Morris and Serra, and talk about exactly how they 
do, and in some cases do not, reflect an explicit understanding of the 
philosophical principles presented in the Phenomenology. In light of 
questioning the links betw een phenomenoligical theory and Minimalist 
practice, we should additionally question the use of this philosophy in 
explaining or justifying various art practices. In accounting for this 
methodological crisis, it may be helpful to use as a point of departure the 
critic Susan Sontag's essay from 1964 entitled "Against Interpretation" 
which calls attention to notable problems in the interpretation and 
theoreticisation of artworks.^ This text seems particularly relevant to a 
discussion of Minimalism in the 1960s and 1970s, because during this time 
we witness a radical formal and ideological shift in the production of art, 
one around which there was a tremendous, as Sontag calls it, 'burgeoning' 
of critical commentary as well as a glut of interpretation. It is in these 
closing comments, then, that we can hope to gauge the limits of ascribing 
to Robert Morris's and Richard Serra's artworks a distinctly Pontean 
heritage. Furthermore, we can begin to re-think the kind of theoretical 
trend which often places the interpretation of artworks in a postition of 
critical authority whilst deeming the first-hand, personal experience of any 
work as unintellectual and thus, of little consequence to the artwork's 
'deeper', historical meaning.
^Susan Sontag, "Against Inierpreiation", Evergreen Review,  1964. Reprinted in Fernie, ed., 
A rt History and Its Methods  (London: Phaidon, 1996); 216-222.
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I. Looking Beyond the Phenomenology  in  the Writings of Morris and 
Serra
In assessing the extent of the relation between Merleau- 
Ponty's philosophy and Minimalist practice, we may look to Robert 
Morris's and Richard Serra's writings for a special kind of evidence which 
could help us to reach a conclusion. One may call this evidence 'special' 
primarily because these texts could act, in part, as written testimony of the 
ideas and motivations which are alongside the artists' works at given 
moments. However, this is not to say that these essays and commentaries 
could be in any way proof of either Morris's or Serra's mindset. Rather, we 
can use their comments as guides to produce a rough sketch of their many 
possible artistic moods and influences. In using these writings in such a 
way, we may begin to question the purely phenomenological accounts of 
their production supported thus far. Instead of obvious connections to 
Pontean theory, we see other, significant levels of engagement in their 
work. This can be seen explicitly in the extensive writings of Robert 
Morris.
Although its decidedly phenomenological overtones have already
been discussed, Morris's essay "Notes on Sculpture, Part I"^ from February
1966 can also be analysed in terms of its attem pt to revise traditional, art
historical appraisals of sculpture. Morris alludes to this aim almost directly
from the outset, for as he claims: "There has been little definitive writing
on present-day sculpture. When it is discussed, it is often called in to
support a broad iconographie or iconological point of view - after the
supporting examples of painting have been ex h au s te d .M o rris , in fact,
speaks very 'art-historically' himself here, and seems adamant about
revising the unbalanced, critical accounts of the relationship between
® Reprinted in Morris, 1-9.
'Ibid., 1.
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sculpture and painting. He achieves this, as will be seen, by using 
otherartists and historians to describe the views of both misguided art 
makers and critics, as well as the more artistically Toward thinking' - a 
select group with which he greatly sympathises. In addition to this, 
Morris's comments appear to inform us less about Iris particular approach 
to art-making itself than do about his artworks' place within the sculptural 
tradition. Importantly, this essay also attempts to state precisely what 
sculpture actually is and is not, particularly vis à vis painting. To 
demonstrate this, Morris asserts: "In the interest of differences, it seems 
time that some of the distinctions sculpture has managed for itself be 
articulated. To begin in the broadest possible way, it should be stated that 
the concerns of sculpture have been for some time not only distinct but 
hostile to those of painting. The clearer the nature of the values of 
sculpture become, the stronger the opposition appears."^
In this short, theoretical essay, the reader is faced with a potent 
manifesto for Morris's projects - projects which intend to carry on the 
traditions of the Constructivists and other early twentieth-century artists 
concerned with the plight of m odern sculpture against illusionism and 
other characteristics foreign to the medium. We can see the artist speak 
directly about the difficult relationship between painting and sculpture 
this century:
The primary problematic concerns with which advanced 
painting has been occupied for about half a century have 
been structural. [...] Sculpture, on the other hand, never 
having been involved in illusionism, could not possibly 
have based the efforts of fifty years upon the rather pious, if 
somewhat contradictory, act of giving up this illusionism 
and approaching the object [...] the sculptural facts of space, 
light, and materials have always functioned concretely and 
literally.®
T bid., 1-3.
' Ibid., 3.
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In support of the experiments of Alexander Rodchenko, Vladimir Tatlin,
and Naum  Gabo - to name a few, early artists concerned with
championing the unique characteristics of sculpture - Morris also calls
attention to "a reassertion of the non-imagistic as an essential condition"^
in the work of the New and Minimalist practitioners. Certainly, we have
seen this trend in Morris's production itself, ranging from his earliest
pieces to his later, 'process'-based works. Yet, in addition to criticising the
use of illusionism in sculpture, which dilutes and distracts attention away
from its reliance on light, space, and materials, Morris launches attacks on
the prevalence of added relief and colour in the sculpture of notable earlier
and even contemporary artists. However, such elements have only
recently been seen as foreign, he claims: "The relief has always been
accepted as a viable mode. However, it cannot be accepted today as
legitimate. The autonomous and literal nature of sculpture demands that
it have its own, equally literal space - not a surface shared with painting."®
Additionally, Morris finds the application of colour to sculpture (when
colour is essentially native to painting and therefore opposed in every,
'perceivable' way to three-dimensional media) to be artistically misguided.
He states: "Color, as it has been established in painting, notably by [Jules]
Olitski and [Morris] Louis, is a quality not at all bound to stable forms.
Michael Fried has pointed out that one of their major efforts has been, in
fact, to free color of drawn sh a p e .H o w e v e r, Morris returns:
It is this essentially optical, immaterial, noncontainable, 
nontactile nature of color that is inconsistent w ith the 
physical nature of sculpture, the qualities of scale, 
proportion, shape, mass are physical. Each of these qualities 
is made visible by the adjustment of an obdurate, literal 
mass. Color, does not have this charactersitic. It is additive.^®
Ibid. 
Ibid., 4. 
Ibid.
" Ibid.
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We can see then that Morris raises the objection to colour because it, as he
says, emphasises the optical features in a sculptural work and in doing so,
subverts its primary, physical nature. This is why, when applying colour to
his own constructions, the artist opts for more 'neutral' hues which rarely
"call attention to themselves".
From M orris's comments we can gather evidence of his critical
crusade w ith which he intends to enliven the debate over contemporary
sculpture. Yet, this evidence does not directly account for the connections
generally made between his own, personal 'philosophy' and the
phenomenological concepts of Merleau-Ponty. Many ideas which act as the
instrum ents of his revision seem related to phenomenology, but not
necessarily that which is particularly espoused in the Phenomenology o f
Perception. M orris's attitude toward the use of colour in three-
dimensional constructions, for example, differs greatly from Merleau-
Ponty's appreciation of colour as an perceptually enriching element. Let us
return to the Phenomenology  for a moment and explore this as well as
other differences. Merleau-Ponty's describes the experience of colour quite
clearly and at length:
to see is to have colours or lights, to hear is to have sounds, 
to sense (sentir) is to have qualities. To know what sense- 
experience is, then, is it not enough to have seen a red or to 
have heard an A? But red and green are not sensations, they 
are the sensed (sensibles), and quality is not an element of 
consciousness, but a property of the object. Instead of 
providing a simple means of delimiting sensations, if we 
consider it in the experience itself which evinces it, the 
quality is as rich and mysterious as the object, or indeed the 
whole spectacle, perceived. This red patch which I see on the 
carpet is red only in virtue of a shadow which lies across it, 
its quality is apparent only in relation to the play of light 
upon it, and hence as an element in a spatial configuration.
Ibid., 5.
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Moreover the colour can be said to be there only if it occupies 
an area of a certain size, too small an area not being 
describable in these terms
According to this definition, colour is not a mere additive sensation laid 
on top of 'things' as Morris would contend, but is rather an integral and 
complex element of perceptual experience. Additionally, Merleau-Ponty 
claims that colour is directly dependent on the effects of space and light, 
factors which Morris argues are best exemplified by structures or things 
uncomplicated by colour. Thus, if the artist did read the Phenomenology, 
one could reasonably argue that he did not wholly understand it. 
However, Morris's first task as demonstrated in this essay is to liberate the 
study and production of sculpture from terms and elements traditionally 
associated w ith painting. Although he repeatedly shows an interest in 
issues relating to perception, the artist's primary objective need not 
necessarily be to proselytise or promote the phenomenological virtues of 
Merleau-Ponty's text. In the end, though, we are left to question whether 
or not a dicussion of Morris's artworks, using distinctly Pontean 
terminology and concepts, is justified. For as we can see in other writings 
by the artist, Morris's mention of perception and its complexities may not 
reflect first-hand knowledge of phenomenological theory.
The artist's essay from October 1966, entitled "Notes on Sculpture, 
Part n",^®provides us with further evidence for Morris's complex concerns. 
His revisionist-styled manifesto is largely continued here, although the 
artist again discusses issues of perception as they relate to sculpture. 
Continuing his somewhat historical analysis of the traditional role of 
sculpture in the visual arts, he suggests:
The size range of useless three-dimensional things is a
continuum  betw een the m onum ent and the ornament.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 4-5. 
Reprinted in Morris, 11-21.
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Sculpture has generally been thought of as those objects not 
at the polarities but falling between. The new work being 
done today falls between the extremes of this size 
continuum. [...] A particular term for the new work is not as 
im portant as knowing what its values and standards are.^^
So then, one may ask, what are these 'values and standards' as Morris 
conceives of them? The artist stresses here that the goals of the New 
sculpture are often to isolate the elements most basic to the three- 
dimensional m edium  itself, whilst expelling and gaining distance from all 
characteristics traditonally associated with sculpture (such as relief, colour 
and so on), which are actually borrowed from painting. However, one 
could also argue that Morris sees sculpture's relation to the spectator and 
his or her perception of art as yet another area of interest for the New 
artists. Arguably, this is because, as Morris tells us: "In the perception of 
relative size [eg. of any object], the hum an body enters into the total 
continuum of sizes and establishes itself as a constant on that sca le ."Y et 
despite this explicit interest in the hum an form as the rule against which 
sculpture is 'm easured', the Minimalists or New artists, according to 
Morris, are still focused on exploring the most primary elements of three- 
dimensional structures which separate sculpture from painting. As he 
contends:
The particular shaping, proportions, size, and surface of the 
specific object in question are still critical sources for the 
particular quality the work generates. But it is now not 
possible to separate these decisions, which are relevant to the 
object as a thing in itself, from those decisions external to its 
physical presence. For example, in m uch of the new work in 
which the forms have been held to be unitary, placement 
becomes critical as it never was before in establishing the 
particular quality of the work.^®
Although it is closely related to the perception and interaction of the
’•* Ibid., 11.
Ibid.
Ibid., 20.
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individual spectator with an artwork, Morris mentions this newly 
appraised quality to emphasise the fact that sculpture maintains an unique 
set of charcteristics which necessitate a discussion separate from those 
about painting.
His essay "Anti Form",^^ from 1968, also describes Morris's belief in
the new artistic potential found in creating so-called 'anti-form ' artworks,
as several of his pieces from the late 1960s attest. In this text, Morris
comments on his reasons for moving from his rigidly geometric, m odular
style (seen in such works as those shown at the Green Gallery), to a more
'process'-based, relaxed approach to producing objects. However, he insists
that his former geometric style did serve a number of purposes:
The use of the rectangular has a long history. The right angle 
has been in use since the first post and lintel constructions.
[...] But only in the case of object-type art have the forms of 
the cubic and the rectangular been brought so far forward 
into the final definition of the work. That is, it stands as a 
self-sufficient whole shape rather than as a relational 
element. To achieve a cubic or rectangular form is to build in 
the simplest, most reasonable way, but it is also to build well.
This imperative for the well-built thing solved certain 
problems. It got rid of asymmetrical placing and composition, 
for one thing. The solution also threw  out all nonrigid 
materials. This is not the whole story of so-called Minimal or 
Object art.^ ®
We are led to believe that in light of M orris's own use of such 'nonrigid' 
and rough media, as in his 1969 installation Continuous Project Altered 
Daily (Fig. 15) for example, he and other contemporary artists are 
attem pting to expand on this very story. Yet, to take this point further, 
what is the 'm oral' in the story of Minimalist art? From the evidence 
gathered thus far, one might say that its lesson, as Morris sees it, concerns 
the dangers of relegating sculpture to a merely analogous status alongside
Reprinted in Morris, 41-49 
Ibid., 41.
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painting. How is sculpture particularly in peril, we may ask? Again 
according to M orris's comments on the differences between these media, 
the use of elements such as relief, colour or relational composition in 
sculpture dilutes those characteristics which are truly unique to it, namely 
its relation to light, space, scale and the passing of time. The result is a 
form of practice which can do nothing but evoke, represent and reproduce 
states of affairs just as in painting. This, then, compromises and distracts a 
spectator's experience of any such sculpture away from those qualities 
most fundam ental to it.
Morris's artworks, from his Green Gallery pieces to his sprawling 
anti-form compositions, can be seen to isolate these fundamental 
characteristics in a move to revise sculpture's relation to painting as well 
as to assert its independence. As we have read in his texts, these issues are 
also closely related to human perception and its complexities. Yet, are we 
provided w ith significant clues to the source (or sources) for the artist's 
ideas and vocabulary regarding perception? It has been suggested, both 
here and in a number of critical texts, that Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology o f  Perception acts as a primary font of ideas for Morris 
despite any explicit evidence of such. Morris constructs his essays in a very 
academic fashion, fully referencing his comments and ideas in detailed 
footnotes. Therefore, if some mention - whether brief or otherwise - is not 
made of this specific phenomenological tradition, we might like to 
question the usual association between his artistic production and Pontean 
theory.
The same could be said for the works and essays of Richard Serra, 
whose production has also been critically linked to the Phenomenology o f
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Perception. It has been suggested in the present discussion that Serra's 
work deals with and manipulates to intriguing, artistic ends several ideas 
put forth by Merleau-Ponty. However we are compelled to ask yet again, 
what evidence is there which would support this interpretation? We may 
return to a number of Serra's writings from the 1960s to the early 1980s, 
and put to them several of the same questions asked of Morris's texts. 
Namely, does the Phenomenology  figure explicitly in his comments? 
Also, what are the lessons or morals of the Minimalist story as Serra 'tells' 
it through his production? To address these issues, we may begin by 
looking once again at the artist's text entitled "Verb List, 1967-68".^  ^
Originally, this list of the artist's actions and movements was read as an 
attempt to describe Serra's body-centred or perception-centred approach to 
art production. However, one could also read it as a simple record of the 
countless forms of artistic (and particulary sculptural) activity. In it, such 
possibitlies appear endless:
to roll to curve
to crease to lift
to fold to inlay
to store to impress
to bend to fire
to shorten to flood
to twist to smear
to dapple to rotate
to crumple to swirl [..
More than it demonstrates any particular influences on his work, the list 
confirms Serra's involvement with a num ber of different techniques. The 
suggestion that this text indicates an acquaintance with the concepts of 
phenomenological philosophy is almost superfluous, if we consider the 
points previously made by Robert Morris regarding the inseparability of
Reprinted in Serra, 3-4.
Ibid., 3.
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sculpture from issues of the body and perception. Certainly, a fascination
with the human body and perception are illustrated here, but it would be
hazardous to argue that Serra's list evinces a distinctly Pontean
understanding of such. In the artist's early production of rubber and rolled-
steel pieces, such as his Belts (Fig. 17) from 1966-67 and Double Roll (Fig.
19) from 1968, we witness the same exploration of the means and processes
of three-dimensional construction as he does in "Verb List", and not a
translation of phenomenological themes.
Serra voices a similar interest in the diverse possibilités of
sculptural composition in his short essay "Shift" from 1973. As
previously mentioned, it serves to document the artist's attitude toward
the making and the effects of his large, outdoor work from 1970-72 of the
same name (Figs. 27a and 27b). Serra describes it in great detail:
We located Dufferin Road, which is the eastern-most 
approach to the site from a topological survey m ap (Lot 2, 
Concession 3, Township of King. Regionality Municipality of 
York, scale of one inch to 400 feet). Surrounded on three 
sides by trees and swamp, the site is a farming field consisting 
of two hills separated by a dog-leg valley. In the summer of 
1970, Joan (Jonas) and I spent five days walking the place. We 
discovered that two people walking the distance of the field 
opposite one another, attempting to keep each other in view 
despite the curvature of the land, would mutually determine 
a topological definition of the space. [...] The horizon of the 
work was established by the possibility of maintaining this 
m utual view point.^
This essay seems concerned less with demonstrating Serra's knowledge of 
certain concepts as it is with describing a total approach to Shift's  site and 
creation. Following the observation of the critic Yve-Alain Bois, one may 
see a number of the artist's writings as "the verbal equivalent of a
Reprinted in Serra, 11-13 
Ibid., 11.
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storyboard"7^  In making films for either cinema or television, the
storyboard acts as a series of panels on which a sequence of sketches depicts
the film's different scenes and action. Like this sequence. Serra's essay
"Shift" maps out both the landscape according to whose distinct terrain the
sculpture will be situated and the course of the artist's movement over the
site. The artist speaks directly about this all-important presence of a mobile
viewer for his composition:
The work establishes a measure: one's relation to it and to 
the land. One walks down the hill into the piece. [...] As one 
follows the work farther into the field, one is forced to shift 
and turn with the work and look back across the elevational 
drop. Insofar as the stepped elevations function as horizons 
cutting into and extending towards the real horizon, they 
suggest themselves as orthogonals w ithin the terms of a 
perspective system of measurement. The machinery of 
renaissance space depends on measurements remaining 
fixed and immutable. These steps relate to a continually 
shifting horizon, and as measurements, they are totally 
transitive [...]. The line as a visual element, per step, becomes 
a transitive verb.^ "*
Indeed the shifting nature of the piece, well-planned out by Serra, relies on 
a hum an element - the moving, walking, visually surveying element of 
the spectator. Thus, not only does the work establish a measure - that of 
the viewer to the total site and elements of Shift - but likewise. Serra's text 
also helps to establish a measure of this particular writing to the artist's 
total project. For, the artist's almost constant motion during the creation of 
tliis piece can be seen in direct proportion to the perpetual movement 
from artistic challenge to challenge and perpetual experimentation 
demonsrated by his diverse body of works.
It is difficult, naturally, to summarise Serra's ever-shifting and
Yve-Alain Bois, "Review of Richard Serra at the DIA Center for the Arts", Artfornm  
XXXVI, N o. 5 (January 1997), 96.
Serra, "Shift". Reprinted in Serra, 12-13.
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varied approach to making sculpture. However, this difficulty in 
conclusively characterising his production could prove the most accurate 
way in which to describe it. Instead of ascribing to Serra's works 
phenomenological roots as is critically customary, we can try to account for 
their shifting nature by looking back at how the artist has spoken in 
different ways about his project thus far. As we witnessed in Serra's "Verb 
List", a body-centred approach to art-making need not be explicitly founded 
on a phenomenological tradition like that of Merleau-Ponty, as has been 
suggested. We can understand this idea more clearly by looking again at 
the artist's work from 1980, St. John's Rotary Arc (Figs. 31a and 31b) and 
particularly, by drawing on a number of his comments about this piece. In 
the preceding chapter. Serra's related essay entitled "St. John's Rotary Arc" 
was assessed in terms of how it may demonstrate the artist's interest in 
phenomenological philosophy. Yet, it could also be interpreted as evidence 
of Serra's interest in a host of other artistic considerations which should 
now be clarified.
Far from speaking in an explicit, phenomenological manner. Serra 
discusses his Rotary Arc in a decidedly broad and descriptive way: "The 
200-foot Arc is a quadrant of an 800-foot circle, its center being located at 
the asphalt edge of the Rotary (Varick Street side) where the oval begins to 
contract. [...] The Arc does not represent the context, but redefines it. It 
mediates a perception of the site but ultimately refocuses attention on 
i t s e l f . O n e  may recognise this casual style of description: Serra also uses 
it when commenting on his large work Shift, in his essay of the same 
name. Here, just as is seen in his Rotary Arc comments, the artist 
emphasises the quality of his work as walked or as experienced whilst in 
motion. In both cases. Serra provides complete topographic descriptions of
Serra, "St. John's Rotary Arc". Reprinted in Serra, 120.
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the scenes or contexts in which his works are situated. He also supplies us 
with summaries of either the artist's or a spectator's movement around 
them. As highlighted previously, many views of the Rotary Arc are 
possible:
Following the roundabout, the driver sees the Arc to the left 
and obliquely, in front. From almost every position in the 
oval, the Arc rotates centrifugally outward. This centrifugal 
reading opposes the driver's centripetal movement. [...] For a 
pedestrian a viewing sequence is not predetermined. Where 
one starts is irrelevant. A curve, having no beginning, no 
end, no back, no front, no right, no left, denies a starting 
point, and any hierarchy of views and viewing positions.
The pedestrian acknowledges the entire contextual field and 
sees the Arc within this diversity. [...] In its length and 
height, it establishes a measure.^®
Thus, we could term Serra's text "St. John's Rotary Arc" a virtual 
storyboard, as we have his essay "Shift". Yet perhaps more importantly, 
there is a similarity between these two texts which points to a significant 
trend in the way the artist conceives of and speaks about his projects. As in 
the earlier essay. Serra describes the artwork as a piece which 'establishes a 
measure' between the work and the spectator who encounters it. This 
essay itself, as does "Shift", also establishes another measure, one between 
the text, the artwork and Serra's larger artistic vision. In it, the artist 
proclaims the primacy of a mobile, perceiving participant to the success, 
and perhaps even completion, of the Arc as well as his other urban 
sculptures. As Serra has asserted, his works 'mediate a perception' of their 
contexts and through these diverse, ever-changing settings, the artist's 
sculptures frusta te any 'hierarchy of views and viewing positions'.
Human perception, according to this description, is an integral
element and critical target of Serra's works. However, can we claim that
his conception of what it means to be a perceiving subject is derived from 
Ibid., 121-122.
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M erleau-Ponty's philosophy? Although the evidence discussed thus far 
makes us uncertain of a conclusive answer, we can come to a number of 
conclusions regarding what Serra's artworks and writings do demonstrate. 
As we have seen throughout his production, the artist's choice of 
materials and his approach to their m anipulation have consistently 
emphasised the importance of diversity, physicality and perceptual 
experience to his project. Just as Robert M orris's numerous writings evince 
a preoccupation with hum an perception for the sake of sculpture's 
revision. Serra also draws attention to his artistic aims by using a 
vocabulary which, like Morris's, places emphasis the body's relation to his 
artworks. However, in the context of Serra's practice this interest in 
perception does not serve to rescue the criticism of sculpture from the 
traditional prejudices which Morris confronts, but rather it serves to 
elucidate the manifold, artistic possibilities Serra appears to find in almost 
all m edia and in almost any exhibition context. Thus, it can be said that the 
issue of hum an perception is treated by these Minimalist artists in two, 
very distinct ways: it can be seen to provide the base for Robert Morris's 
revision of art practice, as well as for Richard Serra's diversification of a 
spectator's art experience. Yet, as mentioned in the extended discussion of 
Morris's essays, the perceived effects of space, light and time are already 
considerations inherent in the practice and experience of sculpture. These 
elements which, in fact, define sculpture as opposed to painting, have 
simply been brought into greater relief by these artist's in an effort to 
redefine and revive its practice.
In light of the diversity of these artists' efforts, it would be liighly 
suspicious to believe, as was initially proposed, that Morris, Serra and
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other Minimalists have looked to a common source for their ideas. 
Indeed, it would be even more difficult to argue that their motivations 
sprang from a single, specific text such as Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenom enology, as numerous critics have claimed. In order to 
understand precisely how these explanations of the New sculpture are 
structured and the problematic handling of phenomenological philosophy 
in such interpretations, we may finally inspect a num ber of critical 
writings in detail.
II. Questioning Interpretation: Minimalism's Critical Reception and Its 
Difficulties
In her book entitled On Abstract Art, the critic Briony Per suggests
that "phenomenology is the philosophy of Minimalism" Yet, one might
benefit from questioning the reasoning behind such a claim. This
interpretation of the New art and several others like it, can be said to have
one characteristic in common: in addition to assuming that a distinctly
Pontean understanding of perception lies at the heart of many Minimalist
artworks, most analyses of these pieces also revolve around their often
startling, new formal character which breaks w ith traditional sculptural
practice. Such a trait is not insignificant, eventhough many would say that
a large portion of art historical criticism already takes up the issue of form
implicitly. However, what makes this critical approach significant to our
understanding of Minimalist production is the way in which such
interpretations find the so-called meaning of these artworks in their
explicit handling of form, rather than in their representational or
illusionistic content. Yet, the critical search for meaning in these particular 
’^'Briony Fer, On Abstract A rt, 135.
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artworks is highly problematic, especially if we consider that pieces like 
those of Robert Morris and Richard Serra develop their meaning or 
significance in conjunction with their spectators and exhibition contexts. 
Perhaps most troubling of all are those interpretations which tether artistic 
meaning to certain texts and concepts. One could argue that this practice 
results in devaluing the direct of experience of Minimalist artworks 
themselves. This argument is specifically pu t forth by the critic and artist 
Susan Sontag in her essay "Against Interpretation" of 1964. Later, we will 
be looking at her comments more closely once the many ways in which 
historians analyse Minimalist practice have themselves been discussed in 
some detail.
Firstly, just as Briony Fer was earlier shown to suggest, the critic
Kenneth Baker also argues that Minimalist production is dominated by a
phenomenological sensibility. In his text M inimalism: A rt o f
Circumstance, Baker explains that artists like Morris and Serra "found
opportunities in the conventions of exhibiting art to investigate the
perceptual and situational factors in seeing."^® Yet, the author makes a
more explicit reference to the supposed phenomenological heritage of
these and other artists' work. He states:
Critics have understood these works [...] in terms of the 
w idespread interest in phenomenological philosophy among 
artists in the 1960s. Phenomenology, and particularly the 
thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, was the subject of much 
discussion in the art world during the Minimalist y ears.^
However, Baker's unsatisfyingly vague and over-simplistic analyses of 
Minimalist artworks do not justify such a statement. His brief mention of 
"M erleau-Ponty's understanding that 'subjectivity is inherence in the
Baker, M inimalism: A rt of Circumstance, 67. 
” Ibid., 83.
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world'"^® and its connection with Minimalist ideas hardly constitutes a
thorough investigation of the relation of such theory to the New art. Thus,
we may like to question this explicitly philosophical reading of Minimalist
art practice. For instance, we may ask why Merleau-Ponty's texts gained the
recognition of artists and critics in the 1960s and after.
The historian and critic Hal Foster directly addresses this question in
his recent text. The Return o f the Real. Although Foster, too, assumes an
explicitly phenomenological (if not Pontean) interpretation of the works of
Morris, Serra and other Minimalists, he is careful in accounting for
precisely how phenomenological theory may have been picked up by both
artists and critics alike. As Foster asserts:
It is true that, as represented by Edmund Husserl and 
Ferdinand de Saussure, phenomenology and structural 
linguistics did emerge with high modernism. Yet neither 
discourse was current among artists until the 1960s, that is, 
until the time of minimalism [...]. Now if this is so, [...] 
minimalism is phenomenological at base [...].^ ^
The author goes on to say, as was suggested tentatively much earlier in the 
present discussion, that the "reception of phenomenology was mediated by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially his Phenomenology o f Perception, 
which was translated in 1962."^ Foster mentions the Phenom enology's  
first translation into English to emphasise the probability of the 
Minimalist artists being engaged with the text itself. However, such a 
connection is not evidence in its own right. As has recently been shown in 
our revised analyses of the writings of Morris and Serra, concrete evidence 
of M inimalism's direct involvement with M erleau-Ponty's work or other 
phenomenological texts is virtually nonexistent. Still, the links between 
his philosophy and the New sculpture are emphasised again and again.
=°Ibid.
Foster, The R eturn of the Real, 43.
Ibid., 243n.
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particularly in response to the ways in which artworks like those of Morris 
and Serra, manipulate and highlight the importance of a spectator's 
perception. Yet as demonstrated, the making and experience of sculpture 
or other non-traditional, three-dimensional works already deals explicitly 
with issues that phenomenology specifically addresses in relation to 
hum an perception. One may therefore argue, as before, that the injection 
of the themes of perception, light, space and time into a discussion of any 
sculptural practice is resoundingly superfluous. However, what critics 
believe to be significantly different about Minimalist sculpture is the 'fact' 
that this work handles several issues of perception in an explicit and 
concentrated manner.
Few critics or historians argue such a case as strongly or 
convincingly as the author Rosalind Krauss, whose comments on Serra's 
Shift we have already looked at. Like Foster, Krauss also alerts us the 
arrival of phenomenological theory on the 1960s art 'scene' in America, 
and in doing so, inadvertantly assists us in seriously questioning both her 
as well as others' use of this pMlosophy in the interpretation of 
Minimalist art. Let us begin by looking at some of Krauss's earliest 
comments on Minimalism and their relation to another notable, critical 
attitude. In her book of 1977, Passages in Modern Sculpture, the author 
speaks about the nature of the 'new sculpture' of the 1960s and 70s.^ As she 
describes it, this sculptural practice "is predicated on the feeling that what 
sculpture was is insufficient because founded on an idealist m yth."^ The 
minimalists' general dissatisfaction w ith this 'idealist' work of their 
predecessors - and even some contemporaries - was described plainly by 
the artist Donald Judd in 1964. Speaking about the problems associated
with the European artistic tradition (problems such as what Frank Stella
“ See Krauss, Passages in Modem Sculpture.
Ibid., 242.
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termed 'relational composition'), Judd commented:
The qualities of European art so far, ... they're linked up with 
a philosophy - rationalism, rationalist philosophy. [...] All 
that art is based on systems built beforehand, a priori 
systems; they express a certain type of thinking and logic that 
is pretty much discredited now as a way of finding out what 
the w orld's like.^ ®
Krauss describes in her text the particular relevance of the two
distinct, critical traditions mentioned by Hal Foster and which allegedly
resuscitated the study and practice of sculpture during the 1960s:
the history of m odern sculpture coincides with the 
development of two bodies of thought, phenomenology and 
structural linguistics, in which meaning is understood to 
depend on the way that any form contains the latent 
experience of its opposite: simultaneity always containing an 
implicit experience of sequence. One of the striking aspects of 
m odern sculpture is the way in which it manifests its makers' 
growing awareness that sculpture is a medium peculiarly 
located at the juncture between stillness and motion, time 
arrested and time passing. From this tension, which defines 
the very condition of sculpture, comes its enormous 
expressive power,^®
Essentially, Krauss suggests that the 'tension' between various experiences 
of time, space and motion 'which defines the very condition of sculpture' 
is somehow made more manifest and immediate by appraising artworks 
with the help of phenomenological or structuralist theory. Yet, how can 
something which is absolutely integral to the very existence of sculpture be 
seen as more integral to its being merely by focusing on it? Importantly, 
too, how can phenomenological theory in the hands of Minimalist artists 
be used to make these integral characteristics more obvious? As already 
discovered, it is unclear whether or not practitioners such as Morris and
Donald Judd was joined by artist Frank Stella in an interview conducted by Bruce Glaser for radio 
broadcast on WBAJ-FM, New York in February 1964, which was entitled “New Nihilism or New 
Art?”. This was later edited by Lucy Lippard and published in Art News, September 1966, Reprinted 
in Battcock, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, first edition 1968, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995); 151.
Krauss, Passages in Modern Scnlptiire, 4-5.
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Serra in fact utilised any specific ideas from phenomenological philosophy 
in the construction of their artworks. At best, we can argue that they do 
deal with issues of perception, time and space, but then, so does all 
sculpture according to Morris as well as Rosalind Krauss. So how, then, are 
we to make sense of the argument promoted by these critics which situates 
at Minimalism's base not only an explicit interest in phenomenology but 
more specifically, an engagement with the work of Merleau-Ponty?
It may be helpful in accounting for this problem to now look to 
Susan Sontag's essay Against Interpretation, which calls attention to 
significant problems in the critical interpretation and theoreticisation of 
both artworks in general and particularly, of contemporary works. For 
example, the text describes various problems raised for the author by 
works of art in different genres, and in particular the theoretical 
assumptions which underly judgements m ade about them. Sontag argues 
that from Plato to our own day, there seems to have been a belief in the 
Western world that art needs interpreting. As Eric Fernie points out in an 
introductory summation of her essay: "As the Western world has become 
increasingly complex, so possible interpretations have burgeoned until 
actual experience of the work of art has almost become irrelevant"; 
therefore, as Fernie says, "Sontag's essay is [...] most directly relevant to the 
debate [...] of theory versus experience".A s Sontag claims, the explanation 
of content in artworks is lauded as essential to their interpretation, 
whereas their form is relegated to an accessory of such interpretation: 
"Whether we conceive of the work of art on the model of the picture [...] or 
on the model of a statement (as the statement of the artist), content still 
comes first. [...] as it it is put today, [...] a work of art by definition says
Fernie on "Against Interpretation", in Fernie, ed.. Art H istory and Its Methods: A Critical 
A n th o logy  (London: Phaidon Press, 1996), 214.
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something."^
Again, this idea appears particularly relevant to a discussion of 
minimalist practice of the 1960s and 70s. In place of an interest in 
representational content, one could argue that the interpretation of form 
became param ount during the time of Minimalist art, for there was a 
radical formal shift in the production of art. Interpretations were centred |
not around an analysis of minimalist works' content or what they |
supposedly 'said ' (something which, however once traditional, was j
becoming of seemingly minor significance); interpretation was now !
focused on their innovative forms and the challenges to spectatorship |
which they offered. Speaking of a time when discussions of content 
reigned over analyses of artistic form, Sontag insists: "What the i
overemphasis on the idea of content entails is the perennial, never !
consummated project of interpretation."^^ Yet, could we not say that with j
the rise of Minimalism, this incessant critique of content had simply been II
traded for a preoccupation with the interpretation of form? In fact, in |
surveying m uch of the criticism aimed at minimalist practice, we could j
also say that the "task of interpretation", as Susan Sontag again states, j
Ibecame "virtually one of tran s la tio n " .O n e  may contend that this new, |
critical re-alignment with the issue of form rather than that of content had j
indeed been made in the 1960s, and that the intense theoretical premises '
(in this case, phenomenological) upon which many minimalist artworks 
are allegedly based created a situation where these works were seen to need 
some form of 'translation', as if presented to us in radical and unknown *
foreign languages. Yet, are they as undecipherable as many critics would |
have us believe? j
Sontag, "Against Interpretation". Reprinted in Fernie, 217. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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III. In Conclusion
The task of this thesis has been not only to trace the possible 
phenomenological influences upon the work of Robert Morris and 
Richard Serra, but also to analyse and question the appropriateness of 
critical approaches to their production - approaches which suggest that the 
intended 'm eaning' of their works (one which is, more often than not, 
provided by critics) is found by means of a feat of intellection, rather than 
by way of a direct, uncoded and accessible experience. As Susan Sontag 
claims, "the effusion of interpretation of art today poisons our 
sensibilities.'"*^ Instead of allowing the act of interpretaion to exist 
primarily on the level of direct spectatorship, the work's 'meaning' stems 
rather from a level of specialised, critical consideration which, 
nonetheless, does contain a modicum of physical engagement with the 
work. Ultimately though, it is in this critical situation that, Sontag states, 
"interpretation amounts to the philistine refusal to leave the work of art 
a l o n e . H e r e ,  we can take this statement to mean a number of things; it 
may mean that such critical interpretation refuses to leave art in the hands 
of unmediated experience, or perhaps even to leave art 'to  be what it will 
be'. In any case, we can question the strength of several interpretations of 
Minimalist practice highlighted in this discussion, and the notion that 
specialised critics and theory have a privileged understanding of the 
arguably complex and innumerable motivations lying behind an artist's 
work.
By calling attention to the problems in interpreting the artworks of 
Robert Morris and Richard Serra, one may also argue that the rise of 
phenomenological (and especially Pontean) readings of their work and
Ibid., 218. 
Ibid., 219.
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that of other New artists stands in direct relation to the emergence of 'new ' 
or revisionist philosophies in critical circles on the whole. Although the 
richly evocative concepts which Merleau-Ponty endorses in his 
Phenomenology o f Perception  are useful in appraising a variety of 
phenomena, w hether it be art or hum an experience, it has been shown 
that Morris and Serra respond to a number of both artistic and personal 
issues in the creation of their diverse sculptural works throughout the 
1960s and beyond. So, in saying that their artworks as well as those of other 
Minimalists attem pt to return to 'the soil of the sensible' or to relate to the 
level of basic hum an knowledge, we mean that these artists' works address 
a plethora of issues relating to art, perception and experience, and not 
simply those issues which, when broadcast by critics, establish the need for 
critics themselves and establish an indispensable role for the on-going 
interpretation of art.
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Fig. 1. Robert Morris, from right to left. Untitled (Table), Untitled (Comer Beam), 
Untitled (Floor Beam), Untitled (Comer Piece) and Untitled (Cloud). Exhibition at 
the Green Gallery, N ew  York, Decem ber 1964 - January 1965.
Fig. 2. Robert Morris, Untitled (Comer Piece), painted plyw ood, 
198.1 X 274.3 cm. Exhibition at the Green Gallery, N ew  York, 
December 1964 - January 1965.
Fig. 3. Robert Morris, detail of three from a total four forms. Untitled (Mirrored Cubes), 
plexiglas mirror on w ood, four units, each 53.3 x 53.3 x 53.3 cm. 1971 refabrication of 
a 1965 original. Exhibition at the Green Gallery, N ew  York, February 1965.
Fig. 4. Robert Morris, Untitled (Battered Cubes), painted p lyw ood, 
four units, each 61 x 91.4 x 91.4 cm. 1965. Exhibition at the D w an  
Gallery, Los A ngeles, March 15 - April 1,1966.
Fig. 5. Robert Morris, Untitled (Ring with Light), painted p lyw ood  
with fibreglass and fluorescent light, two units, each 61 cm high  
and 35.6 cm deep, overall 246.4 cm wide. 1965-66. Dallas M useum  
of Art.
Fig. 6. Robert Morris, Untitled (Quarter-Round Mesh), steel mesh, 
78.7 X 276.9 x 276.9 cm. 1966. Solom on R. Guggenheim , N ew  
York, Panza Collection.
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Fig. 8. Robert Morris, detail of five from a total nine forms. 
Untitled (Nine Fibreglass Sleeves), translucent fibreglass, nine 
units, each 121.9 x 61 x 61 cm. 1967. Sonnabend Collection, 
N ew  York.
Fig. 9. Robert Morris, Untitled (Fibreglass Cloud), translucent fibreglass and nylon  
threads,45.7 x 244 x 244 cm. 1967. Tate Gallery, London.
Fig. 10. Robert Morris, Untitled (Tangle), felt, 2.5 cm thick, overall d im ensions variable. 
1967. Collection Philip Johnson.
Fig. 11. Robert Morris, Untitled (Tangle), felt, 264 pieces, each 1.3 cm thick, overall 
dimensions variable. 1967. National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.
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Fig. 12. Robert Morris, Steam, steam, m ultiple steam outlets under a bed of stones 
outlined with w ood, overall dim ensions variable. 1974 refabrication of a 1967 
original. Western W ashington University, Bellingham.
Fig. 13. Robert Morris, detail of three from a total six states,Continuous 
Project Altered Daily, m ixed m edia, overall dim ensions variable. 1969. 
Installation at the Leo Castelli W arehouse, N ew  York, March 1 -2 2 ,1 9 6 9 .
Fig. 14. Robert Morris, Untitled (Tlireadwaste), threadwaste, asphalt, mirrors, 
copper tubing and felt, overall dim ensions variable. 1968. The M useum  of 
M odem  Art, N ew  York.
Fig. 15. Robert Morris, detail. Untitled (Dirt), earth, grease, peat moss, brick, 
steel, copper, alum inium , brass, zinc and felt, w eighing a total of 907.18 kg, 
overall dimensions variable. 1968. Exhibition at Dwan Gallery, N ew  York, 
October 1968.
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Fig. 16. Richard Serra, Doors, rubber and fibreglass, four parts, each 91.5 x 
275 cm. 1966-1967. Akira Ikeda Gallery, Tokyo.
»Fig. 17. Richard Serra, Belts, vulcanised rubber and blue neon tubing, 
214 X 732 X 51 cm. 1966-1967. Collection of Giuseppe Panza di Biumo, 
Varese.
Fig. 18. Richard Serra, To Lift, vulcanised rubber, 91.5 x 203 cm. 1967. 
Galerie Reinhard Onnasch, Berlin.
Fig. 19. Richard Serra, Double Roll, lead, 15 x 15 x 244 cm. 
1968. Stedelijk M useum , Amsterdam.
Fig. 20. Richard Serra, Casting, lead, 10 x 762 x 457 cm. 1969. Installed and 
later destroyed, W hitney M useum  of American Art, N ew  York, 1969.
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Fig. 21. Richard Serra, Prop, lead antimony, plate: 
152 X 152 cm, pole: 244 cm. 1968. Whitney M useum  
of American Art, N ew  York.
Fig. 22. Richard Serra, Right Angle Prop, lead antimony, 183 x 183 cm. 
1969. The Solom on R. G uggenheim  M useum, N ew  York.
Fig. 23. Richard Serra, One Ton Prop (House of Cards) lead 
antimony, four plates, each 122 x 122 cm. 1969. The M useum  
of M odem  Art, N ew  York.
Fig. 24. Richard Serra, Skiillcracker Series: Stacked 
Steel Slabs, hot rolled steel, sixteen slabs, 610 x 244 x 
305 cm overall. 1969. Installed and later destroyed, 
Kaiser Steel Corporation, Fontana, California, 1969.
Fig. 25. Richard Serra, To Encircle Base Plate Hexagram, 
Right Angles Inverted, steel, rim 2.5 x 20 cm, diameter 
792 cm. 1970. Installed between 183 Street and Webster 
Avenue, the Bronx, N ew  York, 1970-1972.
Figs. 26a and 26b. Richard Serra, above and below, Pulitzer Piece: 
Stepped Elevation, Cor-Ten steel, three plates, (1) 152 cm x 12.27 m x 
5 cm, (2) 152 cm x 14 m x 5 cm, (3) 152 cm x 15.42 m x 5 cm. 1970-1971. 
Located in a 137 x 137 m area. Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Joseph 
Pulitzer, Jr., St. Louis.
Figs. 27a and 27b, Richard Serra, above and below. Shift, concrete, 
six sections, each ranging from 152 cm x 27.43 m x 20 cm to 152 cm x 
73.15 m X 20 cm. 1970-1972. Installed in King City, Ontario. Collection  
of Roger Davidson, Toronto.
m m m
Fig. 28. Richard Serra, Spin Ont: For Bob Smithsoi^, hot rolled steel, 
three plates, each 305 cm x 12.19 m 4 cm. 1972-1973. Rijksmuseum  
Krôller-Müller, Otterlo.
mFig. 29. Richard Serra, Wright's Triangle, 
Cor-Ten steel, 305 cm x 10.97 m x 10.97 m. 
1976-1980. Installed at Western Washington 
University, Bellingham.
M E R
Fig. 30. Richard Serra, Terminal, Cor-Ten steel, 
four trapezoidal plates, each 12.50 m x 274 to 
366 cm (irregular) x 6.5 cm. 1977. Installed at the 
Hauptbahnhof, Bochum. Collection of the City of 
Bochum.
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%Figs. 31a and 31b. Richard Serra, above and below,
St. John's Rotary Arc, Cor-Ten steel, 366 cm x 60.96 m x 
6.5 cm. 1980. Installed at the Holland Tunnel exit, N ew  
York, 1980-1988.
Fig. 32. Richard Serra, Gedenkstiitte Goslar, forged steel, 
279 X 279 X 28 cm. 1981. Installed in Goslar. Collection of 
the Ci tv of Goslar.
3 * ^
Figs. 33a and 33b. Richard Serra, above and below. Tilted Arc, 
Cor-Ten steel, 366 cm x 36.58 m x 6.5 cm. 1981. Installed in the 
Federal Plaza, N ew  York, and destroyed March 15, 1989.
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